CAJ | 학술논문

本文力图描绘政府R＆D补贴对企业R＆D支出的激励效应与挤出效应的分布，并对两种效应在不同政治环境和企业性质下的差异进行探索性研究。本文以中国上市公司2007-2009年的数据为样本进行实证研究，研究发现，政府R＆D补贴会对企业产生激励效应和挤出效应，两种效应的分布图呈“倒U型”；政府补贴在初始阶段会对企业研发支出起显著促进作用，但这种激励效应会随政府补贴力度的不断增大而减弱，当超过最优补贴值后，会对企业研发支出产生挤出效应；在补贴方式上，间接补贴的效应比直接补贴更显著。进一步的分组考察发现，企业所处地区政治环境越差、反腐败力度越弱，R＆D补贴的效应越不显著，反之亦然；相对国有企业而言，政府对民营企业R＆D补贴的效应更显著。
본문력도묘회정부R＆D보첩대기업R＆D지출적격려효응여제출효응적분포，병대량충효응재불동정치배경화기업성질하적차이진행탐색성연구。본문이중국상시공사2007-2009년적수거위양본진행실증연구，연구발현，정부R＆D보첩회대기업산생격려효응화제출효응，량충효응적분포도정“도U형”；정부보첩재초시계단회대기업연발지출기현저촉진작용，단저충격려효응회수정부보첩력도적불단증대이감약，당초과최우보첩치후，회대기업연발지출산생제출효응；재보첩방식상，간접보첩적효응비직접보첩경현저。진일보적분조고찰발현，기업소처지구정치배경월차、반부패력도월약，R＆D보첩적효응월불현저，반지역연；상대국유기업이언，정부대민영기업R＆D보첩적효응경현저。
As the core power of economic growth, technological innovation is also the purpose of companies＇ re- search and development activities. Nowadays, many countries increase their total R＆D expenditures to speed up their deployment of technology. In order to encourage companies to strengthen their own independent research and development abilities and become the principal part of technological innovation gradually, the government would subsidy the companies on R＆D activities, Chinese government included. China has increased its total R＆D ex- penditures year by year, but whole technological competition and advanced level in worlds of the current domestic companies compare to still have the bigger margin. What is the cause of the low level of independence R＆D capaci- ty of high-technology？ And what＇s the role of government R＆D subsidy on companies＇ R＆D expenditures？ As some authors find that government R＆D subsidy would cause the incentive effect while some of them consider government R＆D subsidy cause the crowding-out effect on companies＇ R＆D expenditures, and it＇s important for our government to make sure its role in research and development activities, so the paper tries to show clearly of the effects of the R＆D subsidy and describe the distribution curve of the effects of R＆D subsidy on companies＇ R＆D expenditures. And then the paper also discusses the difference of the effects caused by different subsidy way, different political environments and different types of companies. Based on the samples of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007--2009, the paper analyzes the effect of the government R＆D subsidy. The research finds that, the government R＆D subsidy not only causes the incentive effect but also the crowding-out effect on companies＇ R＆D expenditures, and the dis- tribution curve of the effects appears as inverse U shape curve. The government R＆D subsidy promotes companies＇ R＆D at the beginning, but the effect started to wane as the subsidy increases. When the subsidy exceeds the opti- mal value it would lead to the crowding-out effect on companies＇ R＆D expenditures. Further results find that in the subsidy way, indirect subsidy is more effective than direct subsidy. What＇s more, the paper also tests the difference of the effects in different political environments and different types of companies. It finds that： the poorer political environments, the weaker the anti-corruption, the more rent-seeking via political connections and then the less sig- nificant effects. Because the unproductive rent-seeking behavior could not help companies to increase R＆D and technology, even lead to a waste of government subsidy resources. Compared to state-owned companies, the effect of R＆D subsidy to private companies is much more significant. Therefore, the paper gives some reasonable suggestions to use subsidy effectively in the end： Firstly, the gov- ernment needs to find the best subsidies amount, which can ensure its ability to fulfill its incentive roles with maxi- mum impact and benefit to the companies＇ innovation. At present, Chinese government R＆D subsidy is not enough to the optimal subsidy amount, so it causes significant incentive effect. But the government R＆D subsidy should be avoided too much to crowd out the companies＇ R＆D expenditure when it exceeds optimal subsidy amount. There should be a withdrawal mechanism for government R＆D subsidy. Then government can stop subsidy when the com- panies can gain the independence R＆D capacity of high-technology by its own R＆D expenditures. Secondly, choose the suitable subsidy way to ensure the effectiveness of the government R＆D subsidy. Thirdly, strengthens the anticorruption, promulgate and put into effect laws and regulations to avoid rent-seeking because rent-seeking is a waste of subsidy resources but not incentive innovation at all. Finally, standardizes the subsidy policies and policies＇ transparency. Government should follow the usage of the R＆D subsidy to find whether it is effective and why some of the state-owned companies have the low efficient. As there are many factors which influence the R＆D subsidy on companies＇ R＆D expenditures, the paper only discusses some of them. Further study can take more factors into account. What＇s more, finding the best R＆D sub- sidy amount and the optimal time to withdraw the subsidy can be researched in the future.