CAJ | 학술논문

控制权私人收益作为大股东与中小股东之间利益冲突体现,是各国上市公司普遍存在的基本委托代理问题,而信息披露是缓解这一代理冲突的重要机制之一。本文以深市所有A股2006—2010年间发生控制权转移事件的上市公司为样本,考察了大股东控制、信息披露因素对控制权转移过程中大股东获取控制权私人收益规模的影响。研究表明,大股东控制力度越大,控制权私人收益规模越大,而在我国目前投资者法律保护不完善的背景下,信息披露作为公司治理的重要机制之一,能在一定程度上缓解大股东对中小投资者的利益侵占。
공제권사인수익작위대고동여중소고동지간이익충돌체현,시각국상시공사보편존재적기본위탁대리문제,이신식피로시완해저일대리충돌적중요궤제지일。본문이심시소유A고2006—2010년간발생공제권전이사건적상시공사위양본,고찰료대고동공제、신식피로인소대공제권전이과정중대고동획취공제권사인수익규모적영향。연구표명,대고동공제력도월대,공제권사인수익규모월대,이재아국목전투자자법률보호불완선적배경하,신식피로작위공사치리적중요궤제지일,능재일정정도상완해대고동대중소투자자적이익침점。
The private benefits of control embody the conflict of interests between large shareholders and small shareholders,which is a basic principal-agent problem of the listed companies of almost all the countries.However,information disclosure is one of the most important mechanisms to alleviate the agency problem.The paper made an empirical study of the listed companies of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange（SZSE） between 2006 and 2010,and explored how major shareholder control and information disclosure influenced the scale of private benefits of control when the control of A-shares changed.Studies show that the greater is the major shareholder control,the larger are the private benefits of control.The legal protection of investors is imperfect in China,so information disclosure,as one of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance,can lessen major shareholders＇ infringement of small and medium investors＇ interests to some extent.