中国工业经济
中國工業經濟
중국공업경제
China Industrial Economy
2012年
4期
89~101
,共null页
资产重组 “环境—模式—效率—股东利益均衡”范式 投入产出效率 治理机制
資產重組 “環境—模式—效率—股東利益均衡”範式 投入產齣效率 治理機製
자산중조 “배경—모식—효솔—고동이익균형”범식 투입산출효솔 치리궤제
asset reorganization; paradigm of environment; mode; efficiency and equilibrium of shareholders＇ benefits（EME-E）; input-output efficiency; governance mechanism
本文引入不含利益倾向性判断的＂股东利益均衡＂概念,提出均衡判断方法,并发展了一个＂环境—模式—效率—股东利益均衡＂（EME-E）的分析范式,考察资产重组中的股东利益分配问题。研究发现,整体上市这类大股东主导的重组现象在表面上是＂支撑行为＂,但其重组效率为负,表明股东利益并不均衡,小股东的利益可能被侵占。该发现有助于解释大股东为何从消极的上市公司＂救火队员＂转向积极的＂锦上添花＂。进一步分析显示,一些模式和环境的重组绩效相对较差,与更严重的股东利益不均衡相联系,其形成机理在于大股东受到的监控和约束相对更宽松。本文认为,重组模式和环境的选择等内部治理机制有助于缓解但难以消除股东利益不均衡,尚需引入外部治理机制以有效制约大股东的机会主义行为,进行策略创新和制度创新以实现股东利益均衡。
本文引入不含利益傾嚮性判斷的＂股東利益均衡＂概唸,提齣均衡判斷方法,併髮展瞭一箇＂環境—模式—效率—股東利益均衡＂（EME-E）的分析範式,攷察資產重組中的股東利益分配問題。研究髮現,整體上市這類大股東主導的重組現象在錶麵上是＂支撐行為＂,但其重組效率為負,錶明股東利益併不均衡,小股東的利益可能被侵佔。該髮現有助于解釋大股東為何從消極的上市公司＂救火隊員＂轉嚮積極的＂錦上添花＂。進一步分析顯示,一些模式和環境的重組績效相對較差,與更嚴重的股東利益不均衡相聯繫,其形成機理在于大股東受到的鑑控和約束相對更寬鬆。本文認為,重組模式和環境的選擇等內部治理機製有助于緩解但難以消除股東利益不均衡,尚需引入外部治理機製以有效製約大股東的機會主義行為,進行策略創新和製度創新以實現股東利益均衡。
본문인입불함이익경향성판단적＂고동이익균형＂개념,제출균형판단방법,병발전료일개＂배경—모식—효솔—고동이익균형＂（EME-E）적분석범식,고찰자산중조중적고동이익분배문제。연구발현,정체상시저류대고동주도적중조현상재표면상시＂지탱행위＂,단기중조효솔위부,표명고동이익병불균형,소고동적이익가능피침점。해발현유조우해석대고동위하종소겁적상시공사＂구화대원＂전향적겁적＂금상첨화＂。진일보분석현시,일사모식화배경적중조적효상대교차,여경엄중적고동이익불균형상련계,기형성궤리재우대고동수도적감공화약속상대경관송。본문인위,중조모식화배경적선택등내부치리궤제유조우완해단난이소제고동이익불균형,상수인입외부치리궤제이유효제약대고동적궤회주의행위,진행책략창신화제도창신이실현고동이익균형。
A new concept ‘equilibrium of shareholders’ benefits＇ was put forward to analyze the corporate governance in the asset reorganization,without prejudgment on interests of shareholders＇.And a new way was suggested to evaluate the equilibrium based on modes analysis and input-output efficiency with improved FA-DEA method.Then a new paradigm of EME-E（environment,mode,efficiency and equilibrium of shareholders＇ benefits） was built and used to analyze corporate governance with the cases of holistic listing in China,a sort of big-scale asset reorganization leaded by controlling shareholders.The analysis of theory model shows：if the performance score is negative,controlling shareholders seize the benefits of minor shareholders.The empirical results show that：①Holistic listing produced negative influence,which means that there exists disequilibrium of shareholders benefits and the loss of minor shareholders＇ benefits.Which helps us understand why large shareholders add a beautiful thing to a contrasting beautiful thing now instead of acting a role of fireman to listed companies.②Reorganizations performance in some modes and environment are relatively worse.The common point of them is that the supervision on controlling shareholders is relatively loose,which may be the important reason of worse disequilibrium of shareholders benefits.③Internal governance mechanism is not enough to solve the problem of disequilibrium.And external governance mechanism is necessary.At last the policy meaning on innovation of strategies and institutional is discussed to improve performance and realize equilibrium of shareholders benefits.
