CAJ | 학술논문

本文主要考察盈余管理是否以及如何影响国有公司高管晋升对业绩的敏感性。以2000—2009年中国A股国有上市公司的高管晋升数据为样本,从操纵性应计利润与非经常性损益两个角度度量盈余管理,我们检验发现,盈余管理会降低国有公司高管晋升对业绩的敏感性,并且当信息不对称程度较低、第一大股东持股比例较高或市场化程度较高时,盈余管理的这种负向影响更大。本文实证结果表明,如果政府无法识别国有公司的盈余管理行为,其高管晋升效率将受到损害,而股权集中度及地区市场化程度的提高有助于增强政府的识别能力,改进高管晋升效率。
본문주요고찰영여관리시부이급여하영향국유공사고관진승대업적적민감성。이2000—2009년중국A고국유상시공사적고관진승수거위양본,종조종성응계리윤여비경상성손익량개각도도량영여관리,아문검험발현,영여관리회강저국유공사고관진승대업적적민감성,병차당신식불대칭정도교저、제일대고동지고비례교고혹시장화정도교고시,영여관리적저충부향영향경대。본문실증결과표명,여과정부무법식별국유공사적영여관리행위,기고관진승효솔장수도손해,이고권집중도급지구시장화정도적제고유조우증강정부적식별능력,개진고관진승효솔。
This paper examines whether and how earnings management affects the executive promotion-performance sensitivity of SOEs,and predicts the effects of earnings management on the efficiency of executive promotion.Using CEO turnover data of Chinese listed SOEs with A-share during 2000—2009 as the sample and measuring earnings management as discretional accruals and non-recurring income,we find that earnings management will decrease the executive promotion-performance sensitivity of SOEs,and the effects are greater when the degree of information asymmetry is lower,the ratio of shares held by the largest shareholder is higher,or the degree of marketlization is higher.These empirical results suggest that earnings management will impair the efficiency of executive promotion in SOEs if it is not able to be detected by the government,however,the ownership concentration and marketlization help to improve government＇s ability to detect earnings management,and then raise the efficiency of executive promotion.