CAJ | 학술논문

股权激励是解决公司代理问题的重要途径之一,是公司治理结构的重要组成部分。从CFO角度探讨股权激励的公司治理效应,对于完善我国公司的治理结构具有非常积极的意义。本文以2005年-2008年间1336-1573家上市公司为样本,研究CFO股权激励与公司业绩的内在关系,结果发现,CFO权益薪酬占总薪酬比例与公司业绩呈显著正相关关系,公司的资产净收益率和资产报酬率均在通过股权激励计划之后显著提高,表明CFO股权激励具有正向公司治理效应。
고권격려시해결공사대리문제적중요도경지일,시공사치리결구적중요조성부분。종CFO각도탐토고권격려적공사치리효응,대우완선아국공사적치리결구구유비상적겁적의의。본문이2005년-2008년간1336-1573가상시공사위양본,연구CFO고권격려여공사업적적내재관계,결과발현,CFO권익신수점총신수비례여공사업적정현저정상관관계,공사적자산정수익솔화자산보수솔균재통과고권격려계화지후현저제고,표명CFO고권격려구유정향공사치리효응。
Stock incentive is one of important ways to resolve company agency problem,and is major component of company governance structure.Exploring the company governance effect of stock incentives from the CFO perspective is very positive meanings for improving our country’s company governance structure.Taking the 1336-1573 listed companies during the period of the year from 2005 to 2008 as sample,this paper researches the inherent relationship between CFO stock incentive and company performance.The results indicate that the proportion of CFO equity payment accounting for total compensation and company performance demonstrate significant correlative relationship,and company’s net asset yield and return on asset have obviously increased after the stock incentives are implemented,which shows that CFO stock incentives display positive effect of company governance.