CAJ | 학술논문

文章基于中国上市公司2004-2010年动态面板数据GMM方法,在证券市场非有效的背景下考察了高管薪酬契约对公司投资行为的影响。研究结果显示,无论是货币薪酬还是高管持股激励,高管薪酬激励和股票错误定价对公司投资行为的影响具有交互作用,股票市场的投机行为会诱使高管为增加从股权激励中得到的收入而更多地投资。同时,这一关系在实际控制人性质不同的企业存在差异。
문장기우중국상시공사2004-2010년동태면판수거GMM방법,재증권시장비유효적배경하고찰료고관신수계약대공사투자행위적영향。연구결과현시,무론시화폐신수환시고관지고격려,고관신수격려화고표착오정개대공사투자행위적영향구유교호작용,고표시장적투궤행위회유사고관위증가종고권격려중득도적수입이경다지투자。동시,저일관계재실제공제인성질불동적기업존재차이。
Based on the dynamic panel data of listed companies in China from 2004 to 2010, this paper studies the effect of executive compensation on corporate investment under inefficient securities market. The results show that there is an interaction of the effect of executive Compensation, monetary compensation or equity incentives, on corporate investment and the effect of stock mispricing on corporate investment, and the speculation in stock mar- ket induces the executives to invest more in order to obtain more equity in- centive income. And this interaction differs in firms with different real con- trollers.