CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过对企业逃避税行为的一般均衡模型的构建，求解出最优均衡解并进一步分析了影响逃避税行为的因素。基于中国数据，对外资企业逃避税行为的社会福利效应进行经验实证，通过内外资企业逃避税因素的弹性比较，指出可通过提高稽查率，控制税率的方式有效地降低外资企业逃避税行为的社会福利损失，处罚率的提高对抑制外资企业逃避税行为作用不明显。
본문통과대기업도피세행위적일반균형모형적구건，구해출최우균형해병진일보분석료영향도피세행위적인소。기우중국수거，대외자기업도피세행위적사회복리효응진행경험실증，통과내외자기업도피세인소적탄성비교，지출가통과제고계사솔，공제세솔적방식유효지강저외자기업도피세행위적사회복리손실，처벌솔적제고대억제외자기업도피세행위작용불명현。
Based on a general equilibrium model of corporate tax evasion, this paper of fers the optimal equilibrium solution and further analyzes the influential factors of corporate tax evasion. Using the data of China, it makes an empirical study of social welfare effects of corporate tax evasion. Then it compares the elasticity of influential factors of tax cwtsion be- tween domestic and foreign-funded enterprises and points out that the increase in detected rates and the control of tax rates can effectively reduce the social welfare losses of tax evasion of foreign-funded enterprises and the increase in punishment rates has no significant effects on inhibiting tax evasion of foreign-funded enterprises.