CAJ | 학술논문

资产专用性情况下的企业治理机制选择问题,与我们探讨的交易费用理论的传统观点有所不同,我们认为除了纵向一体化机制可以解决因资产专用性所带来的＂敲竹杠＂问题之外,企业政治行为也同样可以实现这一目标。而且与纵向一体化是一种以效率为导向的事后治理机制有所不同,企业政治行为是一种以战略为导向的事前治理机制,两者是可以相互替代的,权衡的标准取决于两者的成本比较。进一步地,我们考察了不同情境下两者的替代情况。
자산전용성정황하적기업치리궤제선택문제,여아문탐토적교역비용이론적전통관점유소불동,아문인위제료종향일체화궤제가이해결인자산전용성소대래적＂고죽강＂문제지외,기업정치행위야동양가이실현저일목표。이차여종향일체화시일충이효솔위도향적사후치리궤제유소불동,기업정치행위시일충이전략위도향적사전치리궤제,량자시가이상호체대적,권형적표준취결우량자적성본비교。진일보지,아문고찰료불동정경하량자적체대정황。
The paper disusses the choice of mechanism of firm＇s governance under the condition of specific asset. Compared to the traditional viewpoint of transactional cost theory, we consider corporate pelitical ac-tivity can resolve the ＂ holdup＂ question result from the asset specificity as well as vertical integration. Ver-tical integration is an ex post mechanism of governance and its aim is eiticiency, while corporate political ac- tivity is an ex ante mechanism of governance and its aim is strategy. All of them carl be substituted by each other, which lies on the costs relatively. Furthermore, we study the substitution under different conditions.