中国人口资源与环境
中國人口資源與環境
중국인구자원여배경
China Polulation.Resources and Environment
2012年
7期
114~119
,共null页
博弈 生态补偿 利益主体
博弈 生態補償 利益主體
박혁 생태보상 이익주체
game ; ecological compensation; stakeholder
对宏观层面中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与地方政府和微观层面农民与市民之间博弈分析。找出促使均衡结果合理化方案，采用的研究方法是博弈论与条件价值法（CVM）。结果表明：①博弈结果难以达成（保护，补偿）协议。实现社会福利最大化，必须依靠中央政府作为媒介进行协商，采取管制与激励相结合的制度安排。②激励的实现通过微观层面利益主体受偿意愿与支付意愿而定，支付不够补偿，中央财政补贴，支付盈余则上缴中央财政，以湖北为例，农民每亩耕地应得到174元补偿，市民每户居民应支付246．6元，中央政府每亩耕地给予农民148．5元补偿。③宏观层面依据微观层面需求意愿与支付意愿的赤字或者盈余，确定区域之间应支付补偿或者获得补偿。研究成果能为区域内部和区域之间耕地生态补偿标准提供依据，为尽快制定耕地生态补偿机制及政策、实现利益群体福利均衡提供借鉴与参考。
對宏觀層麵中央政府與地方政府、地方政府與地方政府和微觀層麵農民與市民之間博弈分析。找齣促使均衡結果閤理化方案，採用的研究方法是博弈論與條件價值法（CVM）。結果錶明：①博弈結果難以達成（保護，補償）協議。實現社會福利最大化，必鬚依靠中央政府作為媒介進行協商，採取管製與激勵相結閤的製度安排。②激勵的實現通過微觀層麵利益主體受償意願與支付意願而定，支付不夠補償，中央財政補貼，支付盈餘則上繳中央財政，以湖北為例，農民每畝耕地應得到174元補償，市民每戶居民應支付246．6元，中央政府每畝耕地給予農民148．5元補償。③宏觀層麵依據微觀層麵需求意願與支付意願的赤字或者盈餘，確定區域之間應支付補償或者穫得補償。研究成果能為區域內部和區域之間耕地生態補償標準提供依據，為儘快製定耕地生態補償機製及政策、實現利益群體福利均衡提供藉鑒與參攷。
대굉관층면중앙정부여지방정부、지방정부여지방정부화미관층면농민여시민지간박혁분석。조출촉사균형결과합이화방안，채용적연구방법시박혁론여조건개치법（CVM）。결과표명：①박혁결과난이체성（보호，보상）협의。실현사회복리최대화，필수의고중앙정부작위매개진행협상，채취관제여격려상결합적제도안배。②격려적실현통과미관층면이익주체수상의원여지부의원이정，지부불구보상，중앙재정보첩，지부영여칙상격중앙재정，이호북위례，농민매무경지응득도174원보상，시민매호거민응지부246．6원，중앙정부매무경지급여농민148．5원보상。③굉관층면의거미관층면수구의원여지부의원적적자혹자영여，학정구역지간응지부보상혹자획득보상。연구성과능위구역내부화구역지간경지생태보상표준제공의거，위진쾌제정경지생태보상궤제급정책、실현이익군체복리균형제공차감여삼고。
The purpose of this paper is to find out rationalization scenario to promote balance result, by macro-level among the central government and local government, local government and local government and by micro-level between farmers and citizens. The contingent value method （ CVM ） and game theory are employed. The results show that ： （ 1 ） the game result is difficult to reach （protection, compensation） agreement, so in order to maximize social welfare, we must rely on the central government as a medium of consultation through the combination of control and incentive arrangements. （2）Incentives are fulfilled through willingness to pay and willingness to accept of the micro-level interests. If willingness to pay is less than compensation, the central financial departments will subsidize, otherwise, surplus will turn to the central government. Taking Hubei Province as an example, farmers will gain 174 Yuan （RMB） per mu of cultivated land compensation, per household in the rural area should pay 246.6 Yuan （RMB） and the central government should give farmers 148.5 Yuan（RMB） per mu of cultivated land compensation. （3） Based on deficit or surplus at the macro level and micro level, regions can determine to pay or receive compensation. It is concluded that the game of stakeholders and the incentive system will be able to provide the basis of ecological compensation standard for internal and trans-regional cultivated land, and provide reference for development of ecological compensation mechanism and policies and welfare balance of interest groups.
