CAJ | 학술논문

在以往研究的基础上，本文同时引入质量偏好和收入差异重置原有消费者效用函数，并构建了一个由版权提供商、盗版商、政府和消费者组成的多方博弈模型，而后应用随机试验分析对模型各主体决策的福利效应及其交互影响分别进行数值模拟，得到正版和盗版产品共存，版权商和政府获得持续反盗版激励的条件下，版权市场演化的过程及结果。据此，为版权业这一特殊产品市场的规制与发展提供政策参考。
재이왕연구적기출상，본문동시인입질량편호화수입차이중치원유소비자효용함수，병구건료일개유판권제공상、도판상、정부화소비자조성적다방박혁모형，이후응용수궤시험분석대모형각주체결책적복리효응급기교호영향분별진행수치모의，득도정판화도판산품공존，판권상화정부획득지속반도판격려적조건하，판권시장연화적과정급결과。거차，위판권업저일특수산품시장적규제여발전제공정책삼고。
As we know, genuine and piracy products have large price disparity and small quality difference, so conducive to technological progress and long-term development of genuine industry. But the academic research of the attitude taken on the piracy has yet to reach an agreement. Innovation is the collective product of the development of human civilization, intellectual property simply to define the private right of the innovator is not conducive to the spread of advanced knowledge, integration and further innovation. The piracy is the effective way of technology diffusion and the global share of human civilization. So what conditions are of the piracy to exist, enter and quit the market？ What kind of impact do the piracy and anti-piracy have exactly on firms, consumers, the government, and overall social welfare？ On this basis, should the government and copyright providers cope with piracy heavily？ In short, there are not only plenty of studies on the piracy based on consumer choice or multi-main game competition, but also the analysis on the impact of piracy and anti-piracy on market parties and its change. It is easy to see that in the market composed by the copyright provider, piracy, consumer and government, the previous studies analyze the demands, prices and profits for the genuine and piracy as a clue to answer above contentious issue. However, due to different perspective and path, there is lack of comprehensive study on the copyright market competition and the game process, and the previous studies did not answer the issues whether market equilibrium exist and how to find optimal genuine price. Therefore, we can not fully explain the decision-making mechanism, supply and demand mechanism, pricing mechanism in copyright market. Based on previous studies, we introduce differentiated consumer utility function and set a multi-player game model which includes copyright provider, pirate, government and consumer. By random test, we numerically simulate welfare effect and interactions of all agents＇ decisions. The conclusion is about the process and results of evolution of copyright market under the condition, which genuine and pirated products coexist and copyright provider and the government get continuous anti-piracy incentives. Accordingly, we provide some policy suggestions for the regulation and development of copyright industry. First of all, when the genuine price is lower than profit-maximizing price, to improve the genuine price is double-edged sword： on the one hand, copyright provider can increase the profit; on the other hand, it reduces consumer surplus to damage the consumer＇s current income. In the long run, the interests of consumer should appropriately transfer to copyright provider, because the profit is a source of incentive to genuine industry develop- ment. However, when the genuine price is higher than profit-maximizing price, to improve genuine price is completely inefficient, which not only harms the interests of consumer, but also reduces the genuine profit. Second, copyright provider determines the anti-piracy effort by profit maximization, which is endogenous by anti-piracy cost, government＇s effort, punishment harsh degree and so on. The government to increase anti-piracy effort not only helps to increase the profit of the genuine industry, and to inspire genuine innovation, but its impact is difficult to clear on the interests of consumer. Lower the cost of the government to combat piracy, it is appropriate to increase the anti-piracy effort. Finally, the government anti-piracy depends on the trade-off between consumer surplus and genuine profit. To reduce consumer surplus for the increase of genuine profit, should be noted that the transfer from the former to the latter is not one-to-one correspondence, because relative to the increase of the genuine profit, the greater the consumer surplus loss. Therefore, the government anti-piracy should be specific economic and social practical choice, only to emphasize strengthening the protection or encouraging the spread of knowledge is biased.