CAJ | 학술논문

由于代理企业能力和努力程度的信息不对称,运用信号博弈和激励约束模型的分析发现：战略联盟核心企业在甄选阶段应提出具有较高强度的信号要求,确定能避免逆向选择的信息租金额;建立适用于不同类型代理企业的激励契约,向高能力者收取一定质量保证金后配以较低程度的质量激励,向低能力合作者提供质量补贴后配以较高程度的质量激励。
유우대리기업능력화노력정도적신식불대칭,운용신호박혁화격려약속모형적분석발현：전략련맹핵심기업재견선계단응제출구유교고강도적신호요구,학정능피면역향선택적신식조금액;건립괄용우불동류형대리기업적격려계약,향고능력자수취일정질량보증금후배이교저정도적질량격려,향저능력합작자제공질량보첩후배이교고정도적질량격려。
Because of information asymmetry of agent enterprise capabilities and effort,this paper employed signal gamming and incentive-restraint model and finds that,in the selection stage,the core enterprise should take a high-strength signal requirement to fix proper information rent by avoiding adverse selection.It establishes a general incentive contract：asking for quality bail in the high-capability enterprise with lower service quality incentives while rendering some allowance for the low-capability enterprise before providing higher service incentives.