CAJ | 학술논문

随着公司治理机制的不断完善，除股东利益最大化和控制风险保证商业银行的稳定之外，对债权人利益以及全社会福利的保护也成为了商业银行高管的任务之一。更多的任务目标条件导致激励契约也更为复杂。在委托代理框架下，进一步分析商业银行委托代理关系与高管所承担的任务内容，基于此在Holmstrom—Milgrom模型框架下建立多任务商业银行高管激励契约并求出满足最优解的条件。分析可得当我国监管部门和社会公众无法提供最优激励时，管理层会愈发追求绩效来保证产出，进而减少在风险控制和承担社会责任上的努力。长期来看，若管理层欲获得最优激励，就必须保证对社会责任的努力是稳定持续的。
수착공사치리궤제적불단완선，제고동이익최대화화공제풍험보증상업은행적은정지외，대채권인이익이급전사회복리적보호야성위료상업은행고관적임무지일。경다적임무목표조건도치격려계약야경위복잡。재위탁대리광가하，진일보분석상업은행위탁대리관계여고관소승담적임무내용，기우차재Holmstrom—Milgrom모형광가하건립다임무상업은행고관격려계약병구출만족최우해적조건。분석가득당아국감관부문화사회공음무법제공최우격려시，관리층회유발추구적효래보증산출，진이감소재풍험공제화승담사회책임상적노력。장기래간，약관리층욕획득최우격려，취필수보증대사회책임적노력시은정지속적。
Because of the improvement of corporate governance, the protection of creditor and social welfare becomes one of the aims of the executives in commercial banks. More targets lead to the incentives more complex. In the principalagent framework, analyze the principalagent relations of commercial banks and the tasks executives taking, establish a multitasking principal-agent model based on the Holmstrom-Milgrom model, and then obtain the optimal conditions . The resuh indicates that when the supervisory department and social public are unable to achieve the optimal incentives, the administrators endeavors more to pursue profits instead of the risk control and social responsibility. In the long run, if the executives would like to obtain the optimal incentive, they have to keep a constant and stable endeavor on social responsibility.