CAJ | 학술논문

依据在陕西、青海农村调研数据做实证观察,发现农村金融机构过高估计农村金融风险,对农村潜在经济机会估计不足。关系型融资在民间借贷与正规金融借贷中产生完全不同的效果,在前者降低了信贷风险,在后者却成为寻求金融租金的温床,本质差异在于两种金融机构的产权属性与激励兼容不同。与正规金融关系型融资联系,农村金融存在逆向选择问题,即贷款投放对象向有实力的基层干部或者农村富裕户集中,结果产生马太效应和加剧农村贫富两极分化。农贷市场中赖账者未必是真正的贫困农户,乡村干部置身其中搭便车、寻租责不可免。农户作为原生态信用载体是农村金融改革发展的重要社会基础,但是需要重新构造农村金融机构体系和金融市场从而形成农村信贷活动的＂信誉触发机制＂,在西部农村地区亟须果断地放开民间组建金融机构,政府职责是因地制宜制定与执行规则。
의거재협서、청해농촌조연수거주실증관찰,발현농촌금융궤구과고고계농촌금융풍험,대농촌잠재경제궤회고계불족。관계형융자재민간차대여정규금융차대중산생완전불동적효과,재전자강저료신대풍험,재후자각성위심구금융조금적온상,본질차이재우량충금융궤구적산권속성여격려겸용불동。여정규금융관계형융자련계,농촌금융존재역향선택문제,즉대관투방대상향유실력적기층간부혹자농촌부유호집중,결과산생마태효응화가극농촌빈부량겁분화。농대시장중뢰장자미필시진정적빈곤농호,향촌간부치신기중탑편차、심조책불가면。농호작위원생태신용재체시농촌금융개혁발전적중요사회기출,단시수요중신구조농촌금융궤구체계화금융시장종이형성농촌신대활동적＂신예촉발궤제＂,재서부농촌지구극수과단지방개민간조건금융궤구,정부직책시인지제의제정여집행규칙。
An empirical observation based on investigation data in rural Shaanxi and Qinghai finds that rural financial risk is overestimated while rural potential economic opportunity is underestimated.Relation-based financing makes different effects in private sector lending and regular bank loaning,the former reducing financial risk but the latter becoming a hotbed for seeking financial rent.The essential difference between them lies in difference between the two financial organs in property right and encouragement compatibility.In contrast to regular financing relation,rural financial lending shows a reverse choice.That is to say most loans tend to be offered to grassroots cadres and better-off families,which causes the Matthew Effect and worsens the polarization in wealth distribution in rural areas.In fact,deadbeats in rural loan market are not necessarily really poverty-stricken farmers,among whom are some grassroots cadres attempting to seek the chance of seeking financial rent.To better the current situation,rural financial organs and markets are to be re-shaped to develop a ＂credit-triggering mechanism＂ in rural loaning activity,especially in western rural areas where establishing private financial organs is to be encouraged.