CAJ | 학술논문

国有上市公司“鄂武商（000501）”在股改之后，六年内发生了两次激烈的控制权争夺战，这一事件折射出国有股东的控股地位所面临的竞争压力。本文首先分析了“鄂武商事件”的典型性，认为“鄂武商事件”代表了股权分置改革之后国有企业产权改革出现的新问题，即股权分置改革在解决国有股“一股独大”问题的同时，也把丧失控股地位的风险推到了国有股东面前；其次，本文认为，国有股东应该参与公司控制权的市场竞争，这并不违反效率原则。然而，非经济目标对国有股东的控制权竞争能力形成了约束，对此，本文认为，赋予国有企业职工在控制权竞争中相应的话语权是一个合理的平衡机制。本文结合案例分析并运用描述性模型对上述观点进行了论证。本文的研究可以为国有上市公司控制权市场竞争的理论研究和制度创新提供线索和参考。
국유상시공사“악무상（000501）”재고개지후，륙년내발생료량차격렬적공제권쟁탈전，저일사건절사출국유고동적공고지위소면림적경쟁압력。본문수선분석료“악무상사건”적전형성，인위“악무상사건”대표료고권분치개혁지후국유기업산권개혁출현적신문제，즉고권분치개혁재해결국유고“일고독대”문제적동시，야파상실공고지위적풍험추도료국유고동면전；기차，본문인위，국유고동응해삼여공사공제권적시장경쟁，저병불위반효솔원칙。연이，비경제목표대국유고동적공제권경쟁능력형성료약속，대차，본문인위，부여국유기업직공재공제권경쟁중상응적화어권시일개합리적평형궤제。본문결합안례분석병운용묘술성모형대상술관점진행료론증。본문적연구가이위국유상시공사공제권시장경쟁적이론연구화제도창신제공선색화삼고。
Split share structure reform reduces the concentration of ownership of state-owned enterprises. The ownership structure of state-owned enterprise tends to balance and diversity, but at the same time such kind of own-ership structure has also weakened the control of state-owned shareholders and provides a necessary condition for non-state shareholders to compete for state-owned control as while. As a state-owned listed company, E Wu Shang （000501） experienced two intense battles for control in the six years after its split share structure reform. The battles broke out between the state-owned shareholder and the private shareholder. This event reflects the reality of the issues of corporate control competition that state-owned shareholders have to face, showing the impact of non-state shareholders for the state-owned control. As we known, one of the main principles of the adjustment of China＇ s state-owned assets and state-owned enterprise restructuring is to maintain control and influence of state-owned economy. Under the competitive environment, to ensure the control and influence of state-owned enterprises should first ensure that the market competitiveness of state-owned shareholders. However, having absolute control over a long period of time, the state-owned shareholder is precisely the lack of market competitiveness. As a special market participant, how do State-owned shareholders maintain the control and influence in a competitive environment？ This is a new issue of SOE reform after Split share structure reform. This article focus on the following issues on the ＂E Wushang event＂ study： What is the institutional back-ground of ＂E Wushang event＂？ Whether the event is representative？ From the efficiency point of view, whether the state-owned shareholders should be involved in the competition for corporate control？ In the market for corporate control, what kind of competitive constraints does the state-owned shareholder face？ And what is the balancing mechanism ？ This paper analyzes the ＂E Wushang＂ event is typical. We believe that the split share structure reform to solve the dominance issue of the state-owned shareholders, but also to push the risk of losing corporate control to the face of them. ＂ E Wushang ＂event represents the typical problems that occur after the reform of state-owned property rights. This paper also argues that competition for corporate control does not necessarily lead to an efficient outcome. Resuhs are also likely to re-configuration of the control of large shareholders. In ＂E Wushang ＂event, large shareholders compete for corporate control for their own strategic gains which are private benefits of control. As the control shareholder, sate-owned shareholders should use the market means rather than administrative means to participate in the competition; this does not violate the principle of efficiency. We uses event study to test the market response to state-owned shareholder＇ s fight for corporate control, did not find evidence to support the negative reactions of the market. We also use a descriptive model to discuss the constraints of non-economic goals of the state-owned shareholders. We point out that such constraints would weaken the market competitiveness of stateowned shareholders; meanwhile we also believe it is a reasonable balance mechanism thai： to give the state-owned enterprise workers the fight to speak in the competition for corporate control. Competition for corporate control is a complex game process, and institutional investors play an important role. The behavior of institutional investors will lead the market response, and therefore have an impact on the process and results of competition. This analysis has not been involved in the influence of institutional investors; this is the inadequacy of this article. Behavior and influence of institutional investors is our further research direction. A property right of state-owned enterprise reform is an ongoing process of exploration, Which is the lack of the reference, and each phase of reform is required to have the corresponding theoretical and institutional innovation. With the new ownership structure after the share reform, the market competition for the state-owned corporate con- trol has become the new issues of the reform of state-owned enterprises. We made exploratory studies on this issue. This study provides clues and references for the theoretical research and the system of innovation about the state- owned listed companies＇ corporate control competition.