CAJ | 학술논문

经理人的自利机会主义行为会使利益相容的股权激励失效已在西方引起广泛关注，国内对股权激励成为高管利益输送渠道和福利安排的质疑不断。本文以《上市公司股权激励管理办法》（试行）颁布后截止2010年末已由董事会授予股票或期权的92家上市公司为样本，运用配对样本T检验以及回归分析，在控制影响盈余管理动机和程度的其他因素后，研究股权激励披露日、行权日和出售日前股权激励水平、激励方式对公司盈余管理行为的影响。发现披露日以及行权日之前经理人进行了向下的盈余管理，出售日前则进行了向上的盈余管理。国有控股上市公司采用股票期权激励方式与盈余管理发生的概率和程度正相关，激励水平与盈余管理程度正相关。研究结果表明，我国上市公司股权激励会引发经理人自利的盈余操纵行为，股票期权并非是当前市场环境下最优的股权激励方式，其他公司治理机制未发挥抑制股权激励引发盈余管理的效应。
경리인적자리궤회주의행위회사이익상용적고권격려실효이재서방인기엄범관주，국내대고권격려성위고관이익수송거도화복리안배적질의불단。본문이《상시공사고권격려관리판법》（시행）반포후절지2010년말이유동사회수여고표혹기권적92가상시공사위양본，운용배대양본T검험이급회귀분석，재공제영향영여관리동궤화정도적기타인소후，연구고권격려피로일、행권일화출수일전고권격려수평、격려방식대공사영여관리행위적영향。발현피로일이급행권일지전경리인진행료향하적영여관리，출수일전칙진행료향상적영여관리。국유공고상시공사채용고표기권격려방식여영여관리발생적개솔화정도정상관，격려수평여영여관리정도정상관。연구결과표명，아국상시공사고권격려회인발경리인자리적영여조종행위，고표기권병비시당전시장배경하최우적고권격려방식，기타공사치리궤제미발휘억제고권격려인발영여관리적효응。
Despite the fact that the relationship between firm value and-equity-based compensation has been intensely explored by many studies and the use of equity-based compensation （ especially stock options for executives） has been a large increase in practice within the developed market economy such as the United States in the past two decades, there is no clear consensus on the effectiveness and efficiency of equity-based compensation till now in academic researches. Whether or not the managers＇ equity incentives becomes adelivery channel of executive benefits and welfare arrangements for executives has continually been questioned in China as well as in the developed economy as from the equity-based compensations were legally introduced into China in 2006, when the Measures for the Administration of Stock Incentive Plans of Listed Companies tookeffect. There are two opposing perspective on the relationship between equity-based compensation and future firm value. The convergence of interest perspective typically advocates that equity-based compensation is an effective device to align managers＇ interests with those of shareholders to reduce the moral hazard problem. In contrast, the managerial power perspective posits that weak corporate governance and acquiescent boards allow executives to determine their own pay, resulting in inefficiently compensation system to decrease the agency cost. So, adding more equity-based compensation in the executive compensation structure cannot enhance firm performance and shareholders＇ wealth since it will cause serious problem of insider control and opportunism, which increases the agency cost between inside-managers and outside-shareholders. Thereby, this paper researches the efficiency of equity-based incentive （ i. e. , whether or not the equity-based compensations add the future value of the firm） of Chinese listed companies based on the perspective of eamings management. We directly examine the relation between the managers＇ equity incentives-arising from equity-based- compensation-and the earnings management opportunism by using 92 A-Share listed companies awarded stock or option to executives by the Board of directors over the periods from the year of 2006 to 2010. Using the compared T-test method, we find that the executives do downwards accruals earnings management a quarterprior to the announcement of equity-based incentive plans and a year prior to the stock option exercised or restricted stock unlocked, while they do upward accruals earnings management a quarter prior to the sale of the equity, which support our hypothesis that managers with equity incentives have motivations to engage in earnings management to decrease the cost of these incentive-shares acquirement, reach the earnings thresholds constrained by the stock option exercised or restricted stock unlocked, and to increase the value of shares to be sold.. Consistent with my prediction, using the OLS multivariate regression, we also get the evidence that the higher levels of equity-based incentive, the more earnings are manipulated by the executives. Moreover, we document that the stock option is not the optimal form of equity-based incentive in Chinese environment, especially in state-owned firms, since the convexity between the stock option and the stock price will give the managers too risk-taking incentives which the managers benefit at the expense of outside shareholders tomaximize the firms value in the context of serious insider-managers control problems and dramatically information asymmetry in the state-owned firms. Additionally, we find that the other internal corporategovernance mechanisms such as governance by shareholders, directors and supervisors are inefficacy onalleviating earnings management within the equity-based incentive. Generally, we document that the equity-based compensation mechanism which theoretically aligns theinterests of executives with those of the shareholders is inefficacy now in the Chinese listed companies because the self-interested managers opportunistically manipulate the accounting earnings in turn share price to maximize their personal compensation in an environment with weak corporate governance. And, the restricted stock is more effective than stock option to add the long-term value of the state-owned firms because that the convexity of stock option to stock price will induce over-estimated risk-taking in turn value-decreasing managerial behavior, which will harm the shareholders under the circumstance that the executives of the state-ownedcompanies in China are likely less risk-averse owing to the inefficacy of the mechanism of managerial market competition caused by the government appoint top manager.