厦门大学学报:哲学社会科学版
廈門大學學報:哲學社會科學版
하문대학학보:철학사회과학판
Journal of Xiamen University(A Quarterly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)
2012年
4期
133~140
,共null页
学术同行评议 委托代理理论 利益冲突 评审管理机构 评议专家
學術同行評議 委託代理理論 利益遲突 評審管理機構 評議專傢
학술동행평의 위탁대리이론 이익충돌 평심관리궤구 평의전가
principal-agent theory, peer review, conflicts of interests, review management institution ; review expert
学术同行评议是一种涉及价值判断的评价活动,是对某项学术工作的水平或重要性的鉴定。从委托代理理论来看,大学学术同行评议形成了一种嵌套式的委托代理关系结构。同行评议委托代理关系中的博弈模型表明,评审管理机构与评议专家很有可能因各自私人利益产生冲突。大学学术同行评议利益冲突的产生,源于委代双方的信息不对称、激励不相容以及契约不完备。因此,增加信息成本以防范利益冲突的可能性、注重职业伦理的"软"约束力作用及建立以奖惩机制为基础的同行评议反评估制度是防范利益冲突问题的有效策略。
學術同行評議是一種涉及價值判斷的評價活動,是對某項學術工作的水平或重要性的鑒定。從委託代理理論來看,大學學術同行評議形成瞭一種嵌套式的委託代理關繫結構。同行評議委託代理關繫中的博弈模型錶明,評審管理機構與評議專傢很有可能因各自私人利益產生遲突。大學學術同行評議利益遲突的產生,源于委代雙方的信息不對稱、激勵不相容以及契約不完備。因此,增加信息成本以防範利益遲突的可能性、註重職業倫理的"軟"約束力作用及建立以獎懲機製為基礎的同行評議反評估製度是防範利益遲突問題的有效策略。
학술동행평의시일충섭급개치판단적평개활동,시대모항학술공작적수평혹중요성적감정。종위탁대리이론래간,대학학술동행평의형성료일충감투식적위탁대리관계결구。동행평의위탁대리관계중적박혁모형표명,평심관리궤구여평의전가흔유가능인각자사인이익산생충돌。대학학술동행평의이익충돌적산생,원우위대쌍방적신식불대칭、격려불상용이급계약불완비。인차,증가신식성본이방범이익충돌적가능성、주중직업윤리적"연"약속력작용급건립이장징궤제위기출적동행평의반평고제도시방범이익충돌문제적유효책략。
Academic peer review is an evaluation activity involving value judgment, and it is the appraisement of quality or importance of the academic work. Academic peer review shows a nested relationship structure based on principal-agent theory. According to the game model of academic peer review commissioned by the agency relationship, it is very likely to trigger some conflicts of interests because of the private interests between the review management institutions and re- view experts, such as asymmetric information, incompatible incentive and incomplete contract which exist between the prin- cipal and the agent. In order to prevent the occurrence of eonfliets of interests, some effective measures may be taken such as increasing the information cost, strengthening occupation moral construction and establishing the system of evaluating academic peer review.