中国工业经济
中國工業經濟
중국공업경제
China Industrial Economy
2012年
8期
96~108
,共null页
股权分置改革 管理层持股 激励效应
股權分置改革 管理層持股 激勵效應
고권분치개혁 관리층지고 격려효응
non-tradable share reform; managerial ownership; incentive effect
管理层持股激励是当前理论和实务界关注的一种重要的公司治理机制。以往的研究往往研究激励契约本身或激励契约的经济后果。然而．激励契约有效发挥的重要前提是该契约与外部制度环境相适应。本文运用制度经济学的基本原理．实证检验了股权分置改革、国有控股、产品市场竞争这三种外部制度环境对管理层持股激励效率的影响。实证研究发现：①股权分置改革前，实施管理层持股激励的公司其经营绩效相比控制样本没有显著差异：股权分置改革后。其经营绩效显著高于控制样本。②国有控股企业采用管理层持股在股改前激励效应不显著．但是，在股改后激励效应显著提高。③在竞争性的产品市场，管理层持股激励有明显的正效应；而在垄断性市场中，管理层持股的激励效应较弱。本文的研究结果表明。制度环境是管理层持股激励发挥作用的重要前提．在实施管理层持股激励的同时。还应重视相关制度环境的改善，使管理层持股发挥应有的激励效应。
管理層持股激勵是噹前理論和實務界關註的一種重要的公司治理機製。以往的研究往往研究激勵契約本身或激勵契約的經濟後果。然而．激勵契約有效髮揮的重要前提是該契約與外部製度環境相適應。本文運用製度經濟學的基本原理．實證檢驗瞭股權分置改革、國有控股、產品市場競爭這三種外部製度環境對管理層持股激勵效率的影響。實證研究髮現：①股權分置改革前，實施管理層持股激勵的公司其經營績效相比控製樣本沒有顯著差異：股權分置改革後。其經營績效顯著高于控製樣本。②國有控股企業採用管理層持股在股改前激勵效應不顯著．但是，在股改後激勵效應顯著提高。③在競爭性的產品市場，管理層持股激勵有明顯的正效應；而在壟斷性市場中，管理層持股的激勵效應較弱。本文的研究結果錶明。製度環境是管理層持股激勵髮揮作用的重要前提．在實施管理層持股激勵的同時。還應重視相關製度環境的改善，使管理層持股髮揮應有的激勵效應。
관리층지고격려시당전이론화실무계관주적일충중요적공사치리궤제。이왕적연구왕왕연구격려계약본신혹격려계약적경제후과。연이．격려계약유효발휘적중요전제시해계약여외부제도배경상괄응。본문운용제도경제학적기본원리．실증검험료고권분치개혁、국유공고、산품시장경쟁저삼충외부제도배경대관리층지고격려효솔적영향。실증연구발현：①고권분치개혁전，실시관리층지고격려적공사기경영적효상비공제양본몰유현저차이：고권분치개혁후。기경영적효현저고우공제양본。②국유공고기업채용관리층지고재고개전격려효응불현저．단시，재고개후격려효응현저제고。③재경쟁성적산품시장，관리층지고격려유명현적정효응；이재롱단성시장중，관리층지고적격려효응교약。본문적연구결과표명。제도배경시관리층지고격려발휘작용적중요전제．재실시관리층지고격려적동시。환응중시상관제도배경적개선，사관리층지고발휘응유적격려효응。
Managerial ownership incentive is an important corporate governance mechanism concerned by theory and practice fields. Previous studies tend to study the economic consequences of the incentive contract or the incentive contract itself. However, the incentives play effectively only adapted to the external institutional environment. This paper examines the efficiency of managerial ownership incentive in three institutional environments： non-tradable share reform, state-holding and product market competition using the basic principles of institutional economics from the perspective of effective contract. Empirical study finds that： First, the small differences in financial performance between companies with managerial ownership and those without in controls samples turned significant after the non-tradable share reform; Second, the incentive effect of managerial ownership in state-owned enterprises was significantly improved after the reform; Third, managerial ownership incentive works better in competitive market than in monopolistic market. The research results show that the institutional environment is an important premise for the efficiency of managerial ownership incentive. Thus the improvement of institutional environment should be concerned while implementing managerial ownership to make the best use of its incentive effect.
