中南大学学报:社会科学版
中南大學學報:社會科學版
중남대학학보:사회과학판
Journal of Central South Huiversity: Social Science
2012年
4期
87~92
,共null页
环境行政执法 效率 社会福利 经济分析
環境行政執法 效率 社會福利 經濟分析
배경행정집법 효솔 사회복리 경제분석
administrative enforcement of environmental law;efficiency;social welfare;economic analysis
以经济分析为方法,通过构建行为模型并以行为模型为基础,对我国环境行政执法政策选择进行分析研究,以清楚认识我国环境行政执法效率不高的症结所在,并提出提高执法效率的基本途径和方法。基于理性经济人假设,环境违法行为会对影响预期违法成本与违法收益的因素做出反应,在环境行政执法中这一因素主要是行政罚款。个人行为模型和行政行为模型显示,我国环境行政执法效率不高的症结在于行政罚款中忽视制裁率问题,并导致行政执法不能产生较好的预防环境危害行为的效果,也导致社会福利的减损,使行政执法的社会效用不能最大化。最优的环境行政罚款政策应考虑罚款数额、制裁率和环境危害之间的相互依存关系。行政责任归责标准、风险偏好和边际效用也会对最优环境行政罚款政策选择产生影响。
以經濟分析為方法,通過構建行為模型併以行為模型為基礎,對我國環境行政執法政策選擇進行分析研究,以清楚認識我國環境行政執法效率不高的癥結所在,併提齣提高執法效率的基本途徑和方法。基于理性經濟人假設,環境違法行為會對影響預期違法成本與違法收益的因素做齣反應,在環境行政執法中這一因素主要是行政罰款。箇人行為模型和行政行為模型顯示,我國環境行政執法效率不高的癥結在于行政罰款中忽視製裁率問題,併導緻行政執法不能產生較好的預防環境危害行為的效果,也導緻社會福利的減損,使行政執法的社會效用不能最大化。最優的環境行政罰款政策應攷慮罰款數額、製裁率和環境危害之間的相互依存關繫。行政責任歸責標準、風險偏好和邊際效用也會對最優環境行政罰款政策選擇產生影響。
이경제분석위방법,통과구건행위모형병이행위모형위기출,대아국배경행정집법정책선택진행분석연구,이청초인식아국배경행정집법효솔불고적증결소재,병제출제고집법효솔적기본도경화방법。기우이성경제인가설,배경위법행위회대영향예기위법성본여위법수익적인소주출반응,재배경행정집법중저일인소주요시행정벌관。개인행위모형화행정행위모형현시,아국배경행정집법효솔불고적증결재우행정벌관중홀시제재솔문제,병도치행정집법불능산생교호적예방배경위해행위적효과,야도치사회복리적감손,사행정집법적사회효용불능최대화。최우적배경행정벌관정책응고필벌관수액、제재솔화배경위해지간적상호의존관계。행정책임귀책표준、풍험편호화변제효용야회대최우배경행정벌관정책선택산생영향。
Based on the behavior model,the author analyses and researches the enforcement policy options of environmental law in a way of economic analysis.The author ascertains the crux of the problem about inefficiency of administrative enforcement of environmental law,and advances the approach to promoting enforcement efficiency.Based on the assumption of rational economic man,environmental illegal conduct would respond to factors affected by expected illegal cost and income.Such factors are administrative fine in administrative enforcement of environmental law.Individual behavior and administrative behavior model show that the crux of the problem of inefficient administrative enforcement is that the probability of sanctions is ignored,resulting in bad effect of administrative enforcement on the precaution of environmental harmful conducts and impairment of social welfare.Because of this,the social utility of the administrative enforcement is not maximized.The optimal fine policy should take into account the interdependent relationship among environmental administrative fine,probability of sanction and environmental harm.Administrative Liability standards,risk preferences and marginal utility will exert an impact on the optimal policy choices of administrative enforcement of environmental law.