CAJ | 학술논문

中国转轨经济下的财政分权体制和政治晋升锦标赛激励地方政府官员将政策资源向有利于自身政绩的方向倾斜。文章研究发现，与买壳上市家族企业相比，直接上市家族企业获得了更多的银行贷款、政府补贴和税收优惠，但同时通过更高的资产回报、过度投资和负担更多的超额雇员服务于地方经济和社会目标。文章分析了地方政府热衷于推动新企业上市并给予大量政策扶持的原因，对于市场化进程中制定相关政策指导地方政府行为具有重要参考价值。
중국전궤경제하적재정분권체제화정치진승금표새격려지방정부관원장정책자원향유리우자신정적적방향경사。문장연구발현，여매각상시가족기업상비，직접상시가족기업획득료경다적은행대관、정부보첩화세수우혜，단동시통과경고적자산회보、과도투자화부담경다적초액고원복무우지방경제화사회목표。문장분석료지방정부열충우추동신기업상시병급여대량정책부지적원인，대우시장화진정중제정상관정책지도지방정부행위구유중요삼고개치。
In transitional China, fiscal decentralization system and politicalpromotion tournaments encourage local officials to allocatepolicy-related resources in favor of their administrative achievements. This paper concludes that, compared to family firms that went public via takeover, family firms that went public via IPO gain more bank loans, government subsidies and tax preference, but serve local economic and social objectives through higher return on assets, over-investment and heavier burden on employment. It analyzes why local governments are keen about promoting listing of new firms and giving much policy support, providing important references for policy formulation aiming to guide the behavior of local officials in the process of marketization.