CAJ | 학술논문

全球金融危机爆发使各国开始重新审视金融创新与金融监管之间的关系。本文运用非对称进化博弈理论，构建金融机构和监管机构之间的非对称进化博弈模型，分析两者的长期动态博弈关系，得到创新与监管的长期进化稳定均衡点，分析了金融机构进行创新和监管机构监管相互作用的影响因素，并提出加强市场约束与官方监管的有效结合、合理利用监管机构处罚机制、建立事前防范机制等政策建议。
전구금융위궤폭발사각국개시중신심시금융창신여금융감관지간적관계。본문운용비대칭진화박혁이론，구건금융궤구화감관궤구지간적비대칭진화박혁모형，분석량자적장기동태박혁관계，득도창신여감관적장기진화은정균형점，분석료금융궤구진행창신화감관궤구감관상호작용적영향인소，병제출가강시장약속여관방감관적유효결합、합리이용감관궤구처벌궤제、건립사전방범궤제등정책건의。
The global financial crisis made all countries begin to take a new look at the relationship between financial innovation and financial supervision. Based on the asymmetric evolutionary game theory, this paper tries to build the asymmetric evolutionary game model between the financial institutions and the regulation authority and analyses their long- term dynamic game relationship. As a result, the paper derived the long-term evolutionary stable equilibrium of innovation and supervision. Meanwhile, it also analysed the factors that influenced the interaction of financial institutions＇ innovation and regulation authority＇s supervision, and put forward policy suggestions that strengthen the effective combination between the market restriction and official supervision, utilize regulators punishment mechanism reasonably, establish prevention mechanism and so forth.