CAJ | 학술논문

我国财政支农资金制度的改革和变迁,带有明显的中央集权和路径依赖特征,是中央、地方政府及农民三者之间利益博弈过程。因此,以制度变迁理论为依托,强化中央政府在财政支农资金制度创新的作用,重视地方政府的＂主体地位＂和壮大农民组织利益集团,实现财政支农资金效益的跃升,这是财政支农资金低效理论研究不可或缺的视角。
아국재정지농자금제도적개혁화변천,대유명현적중앙집권화로경의뢰특정,시중앙、지방정부급농민삼자지간이익박혁과정。인차,이제도변천이론위의탁,강화중앙정부재재정지농자금제도창신적작용,중시지방정부적＂주체지위＂화장대농민조직이익집단,실현재정지농자금효익적약승,저시재정지농자금저효이론연구불가혹결적시각。
The reform and change of fiscal？ fund？ system for assisting agriculture in China have the distinct features of centralization and path dependence, it is the game process between the central government, local governments and peasants. So, under the guideline of the theory of institutional change, it is to strengthen the mastery reaction of central government in institution innovation, to attach great importance to the subject position？ of local government, to strengthen the interest group of peasant organization, and to bring about the benefit ascent of fiscal fund for assisting agriculture. It is a fundamental angle of view on the theoretical？ study about low efficient？ of fiscal fund for assisting agriculture.