CAJ | 학술논문

民主政治决策可以模制为一般性政治决策所包含的两阶段式的复杂博弈。如果通过博弈分析方法集中讨论麦迪逊式民主,即在政府各部门之间就有关解释宪法之意涵发生冲突时立法至上,那么就能真实地诠释美国民主之真谛。当然,主题研究更可能的目的在于,运用两阶段式博弈理论为公民和政府决策执行者诠释宪法提供更为有效的方法。
민주정치결책가이모제위일반성정치결책소포함적량계단식적복잡박혁。여과통과박혁분석방법집중토론맥적손식민주,즉재정부각부문지간취유관해석헌법지의함발생충돌시입법지상,나요취능진실지전석미국민주지진체。당연,주제연구경가능적목적재우,운용량계단식박혁이론위공민화정부결책집행자전석헌법제공경위유효적방법。
In the United States, constttutional democracy can be modeled as a complex game mvolvlng two general stages of political decision making. But the larger purpose of this paper has been to suggest that the two-stage gametheoretic framework can be a useful tool for citizens and constitutional designers in case of interpreting and practicing the constitutional democracy.