管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2012年
3期
159~165
,共null页
闭环供应链 再制造 知识产权 专利许可
閉環供應鏈 再製造 知識產權 專利許可
폐배공응련 재제조 지식산권 전리허가
closed-loop supply chain; remanufacturing; intellectual property rights; patent licensing
在专利完善市场,受专利保护的原制造商享有产品再制造的专有权利,只有获得原制造商的专利许可,第三方再制造商才能进行旧产品的回收再制造。本文分析了受专利保护下原制造商所采取的不同再制造策略:阻止旧产品再制造(N策略)、原制造商自己再制造(O策略)和许可第三方再制造商进行再制造(A策略),并建立了由零售商负责旧产品回收的闭环供应链模型。通过比较发现,只有在第三方再制造商处理旧产品的节省成本足够低时,受专利保护的原制造商才会选择许可第三方再制造商进行旧产品再制造。
在專利完善市場,受專利保護的原製造商享有產品再製造的專有權利,隻有穫得原製造商的專利許可,第三方再製造商纔能進行舊產品的迴收再製造。本文分析瞭受專利保護下原製造商所採取的不同再製造策略:阻止舊產品再製造(N策略)、原製造商自己再製造(O策略)和許可第三方再製造商進行再製造(A策略),併建立瞭由零售商負責舊產品迴收的閉環供應鏈模型。通過比較髮現,隻有在第三方再製造商處理舊產品的節省成本足夠低時,受專利保護的原製造商纔會選擇許可第三方再製造商進行舊產品再製造。
재전리완선시장,수전리보호적원제조상향유산품재제조적전유권리,지유획득원제조상적전리허가,제삼방재제조상재능진행구산품적회수재제조。본문분석료수전리보호하원제조상소채취적불동재제조책략:조지구산품재제조(N책략)、원제조상자기재제조(O책략)화허가제삼방재제조상진행재제조(A책략),병건립료유령수상부책구산품회수적폐배공응련모형。통과비교발현,지유재제삼방재제조상처리구산품적절성성본족구저시,수전리보호적원제조상재회선택허가제삼방재제조상진행구산품재제조。
Due to high demand in many raw material markets and the increased awareness of the environmental impact of disposal, the recycling of end-of-life (EOL) products has attracted much attention. By remanufacturing and remarketing used products, a company can obtain enormous social and economic benefits. However, in the patent perfect market the original manufacturer is protected by patent products and owns the exclusive right to remanufacturing. The third-party manufacturers cannot remanufacture used products until the original manufacturer's patent licensing expires. The current literature primarily discusses the remanufacturing-related intellectual property protection from legal perspective. There is a lack of literature in this area from managerial perspective. In the face of competition with remanufacturers, the original manufacturer often adopts two strategies to minimize the loss of potential benefits : remanufacturing or recycling. There is little literature about the use of intellectual property protection to to help the original manufacturer compete with the remanufacturer of used products. This paper discusses different remanufacturing strategies of the original manufacturer for both new products and remanufacturing products. A closed-loop supply chain model is established to examine the impacts of patent licensing in a decentralized system in which the retailer is responsible for products recovery. We assume that the original manufacturer adopts different remanufacturing strategies to protect its patent: no remanufacturing ( N strategy), original manufacturer remanufacturing ( O strategy) and authorized third-party remanufacturing (A strategy). The results show that remanufacturing of used products can increase profit for all supply chain parties when new products and remanufactured products have same quality regardless of remanufacturing strategies. Under the licensing strategy, the original manufacturer can change patent licensing fees to influence the decision-making of the third-party remanufacturer. In comparison, the original manufacturer would authorize third-party remanufacturer to remanufacture used products when the remanufacturing cost of the third party remanufacturer is low. In this case, the original manufacturer approves the third-party manufacturer to remanufacture used products. This strategy not only can enhance the profits of the original manufacturer and its retailer, but also improve the performance of the closed-loop supply chain system. In summary, the patent licensing of remanufacturing is a strategic approach for the original manufacturer to obtain technological gains. This paper adopts the game theory to study the closed-loop supply chain model for patent protection. The major findings of thisstudy can provide theoretical contributions and practical implications for the original manufacturer to improve its remanufacturing decision-making effectiveness in the closed-loop supply chain.