管理工程学报
管理工程學報
관리공정학보
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
2012年
3期
191~196
,共null页
吴孝灵 周晶 王冀宁 陈星光
吳孝靈 週晶 王冀寧 陳星光
오효령 주정 왕기저 진성광
BOT项目 项目投资 特许权期 招标合同 最优机制
BOT項目 項目投資 特許權期 招標閤同 最優機製
BOT항목 항목투자 특허권기 초표합동 최우궤제
BOT project; project investment; concession term; tender contract; optimal mechanism
为让管理水平较高的私营集团获得BOT项目特许权,并实现项目社会福利最大,本文利用机制设计理论建立了一个关于BOT项目投资与特许权期的二维招标合同的直接机制模型。通过模型分析,获得了该招标机制的可行性条件,最优形式和相应配置方案,并由一个算例表明,得到的最优招标机制在实际中是有效的。所获结果为政府对BOT特许权招标提供了一种理论指导和实际方法。
為讓管理水平較高的私營集糰穫得BOT項目特許權,併實現項目社會福利最大,本文利用機製設計理論建立瞭一箇關于BOT項目投資與特許權期的二維招標閤同的直接機製模型。通過模型分析,穫得瞭該招標機製的可行性條件,最優形式和相應配置方案,併由一箇算例錶明,得到的最優招標機製在實際中是有效的。所穫結果為政府對BOT特許權招標提供瞭一種理論指導和實際方法。
위양관리수평교고적사영집단획득BOT항목특허권,병실현항목사회복리최대,본문이용궤제설계이론건립료일개관우BOT항목투자여특허권기적이유초표합동적직접궤제모형。통과모형분석,획득료해초표궤제적가행성조건,최우형식화상응배치방안,병유일개산례표명,득도적최우초표궤제재실제중시유효적。소획결과위정부대BOT특허권초표제공료일충이론지도화실제방법。
Tendering and bidding are two important trading mechanisms. However, many Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects are having issues with the concession bid. For instance, private groups sometimes falsify bidding information in order to win a bid from Chinese government. Therefore, it is important to redesign tendering and bidding mechanisms in order to maximize the social welfare of a BOT project. There is a lack of study on concession tender issues for BOT projects. This paper investigates a two-dimensional tender problem associated with BOT project's investment and concession period. We also consider the effect of the concession period on the private investment in the tendering practice. A direct tendering mechanism model on BOT project's investment and concession period is proposed according to the mechanism design theory. The proposed model can help derive the feasible condition, optimal form, and corresponding distribution program for the implementation of tendering mechanism. Firstly, it is difficult for the government to know the private group's information, such as themanagement level in the tendering process. A direct tendering mechanism model on the BOT project's investment and concession term is proposed. The model enables us to obtain the optimal direct tender mechanism and test its feasibility. Secondly, to select the private group with the highest management level for the project implementation, the distribution program for the BOT project's concession tender is discussed based on the analysis of optimal direct tender mechanism. The discussion results indicate that the BOT concession tender with the inclusion of the competing bidding variable can not only help the government choose a private investor with the highest management level from the fury competing market, but also maximize the project's benefits. Finally, the analysis of a computing example shows that the obtained conclusions not only are valid and applicable, but also provide the government with a theoretical guidance and a practical approach for implementing BOT project's concession tender.