浙江大学学报:人文社会科学版
浙江大學學報:人文社會科學版
절강대학학보:인문사회과학판
Journal of Zhejiang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)
2012年
5期
90~98
,共null页
专利资助 垃圾专利 程序设计 择优资助 筛选机制 专利权评价报告 科技查新
專利資助 垃圾專利 程序設計 擇優資助 篩選機製 專利權評價報告 科技查新
전리자조 랄급전리 정서설계 택우자조 사선궤제 전리권평개보고 과기사신
patent subsidy junk patent setup process merit-based funding screening system patent evaluation report science and technology novelty search
专利资助政策带来了专利申请的春天,但也面临"诱发垃圾专利"的责难。究其根源,在于资助程序设计存在瑕疵:专利资助政策罔顾我国专利初步审查制的缺陷,将不经实质审查的实用新型和外观设计纳入资助范围,却缺乏相应的专利筛选机制,且资助额度设置不当,扭曲了部分专利权人的申请初衷。专利资助政策走出困境的路径有两条:一是借鉴他国利用检索报告限制行使不稳定专利权的做法,将专利权评价报告设置成资助前置程序;二是借用科技查新体系,将科技查新列入资助必经程序。以专利含金量为考量基点,限缩资助范围,择优资助,可克服专利领域的规制失灵现象,从而实现政府促进科技发展的规制目标。
專利資助政策帶來瞭專利申請的春天,但也麵臨"誘髮垃圾專利"的責難。究其根源,在于資助程序設計存在瑕疵:專利資助政策罔顧我國專利初步審查製的缺陷,將不經實質審查的實用新型和外觀設計納入資助範圍,卻缺乏相應的專利篩選機製,且資助額度設置不噹,扭麯瞭部分專利權人的申請初衷。專利資助政策走齣睏境的路徑有兩條:一是藉鑒他國利用檢索報告限製行使不穩定專利權的做法,將專利權評價報告設置成資助前置程序;二是藉用科技查新體繫,將科技查新列入資助必經程序。以專利含金量為攷量基點,限縮資助範圍,擇優資助,可剋服專利領域的規製失靈現象,從而實現政府促進科技髮展的規製目標。
전리자조정책대래료전리신청적춘천,단야면림"유발랄급전리"적책난。구기근원,재우자조정서설계존재하자:전리자조정책망고아국전리초보심사제적결함,장불경실질심사적실용신형화외관설계납입자조범위,각결핍상응적전리사선궤제,차자조액도설치불당,뉴곡료부분전리권인적신청초충。전리자조정책주출곤경적로경유량조:일시차감타국이용검색보고한제행사불은정전리권적주법,장전리권평개보고설치성자조전치정서;이시차용과기사신체계,장과기사신렬입자조필경정서。이전리함금량위고량기점,한축자조범위,택우자조,가극복전리영역적규제실령현상,종이실현정부촉진과기발전적규제목표。
While patent subsidy policy ushers in a new era for patent applications, it is also being blamed for "inducing junk patents." A review of the policy's operation over the last several years highlights the reasons for attributing questionable patents to the policy. First, patent subsidy policy is not in alignment with the patent system in China. It ignores the shortcomings of China's preliminary examination system and subsidizing utility models and designs without substantive examination. Next, patent subsidy policy lacks a screening system for examining patentability. A generalized subsidy without quality control inevitably leads to junk patents. Finally, the patent subsidy amount is not properly specifie& The appealing profit margin distorts the original intention of patentees and lures speculators to abuse the system by using patent applications as a means to turn a quick profit. Patent subsidy policy can get out of the predicament through two routes. The first is to learn from the practices of other countries that restrict the exercise of unstable patent rights with search reports and require a patent evaluation report as a part of the subsidy applicatiorL The ,t official patent quality certification't by China's State Intellectual Property Office featuring more thorough examinations caneffectively curb questionable patem applications and squeeze out the bubbles in patent applications and grants. The second is to employ the science and technology search system,and use it so that it is the only way to subsidy application. Through systematic,objective and accurate literature searches and informatics evaluation, the science and technology novelty search provides an evaluation foundation for patent subsidy and rejects low value patents from accessing patent subsidies, thus effectively uprooting ill-intentioned subsidy applications. Regarding the procedural design, the relevant supporting systems need to be more detailed. First, patent subsidy application materials must be increased. Subsidy applicants should be required to submit patent evaluation reports or science and technology novelty search reports, as well as the corresponding payment vouchers, so that subsidy examination bodies can evaluate the authenticity and patentability. Second,the duration of patent subsidy application needs to be extended. The time required for patent evaluation reports and science and technology novelty search reports should be included within this process. Third,the patent subsidy amount should be substantially increased. Not only should the costs of patent evaluation report searches and science and technology novelty search be included, but the subsidy for valuable, quality patents should be significantly increased so as to attract valuable technological solutions to the patent application procedure. By implementing the patent subsidy policy, the government intervenes in science and technology with administrative subsidies, which, together with market regulation, serves as a structural incentive. However, the superficially prosperous patent landscape has deviated from its main purpose of advancing science and technology through incentive regulation. Therefore, it is not only imperative, but urgent that an examination of the problems of the current patent subsidy method be carried out. This paper focuses on optimizing incentive mechanisms, with the aim to integrate science and technology resources, increase incentive efficiency, and overcome the patent regulation failure. With patent value as the evaluation benchmark,a sound strategy for patent subsidy policy is to limit subsidy coverage and subsidize quality patents. Through such reforms, government regulation on patents can be put back on the right track so that the government can facilitate the development of science and technology and increase economic strength.