CAJ | 학술논문

迄今为止，风险投资（简称VC）在创业企业中的作用问题一直备受争议，国外学术界有两种截然不同的看法：一是“认证监督”；二是“追求声誉”。本文通过收集我国创业板上市公司2009年10月-2011年12月的有关数据，运用实证分析方法探讨VC在我国创业企业中的作用与动机。研究结果表明，总体上VC介入创业板上市公司的主要目的并非是发挥认证监督作用，而是注重追求声誉，且强烈追逐声誉的动机实质上是“追逐利润”。本文研究的主要结论是：（1）有VC介入的上市公司其上市首日折价率显著高于没有VC介入的上市公司，可见VC在创业企业中注重“追求声誉”；（2）通过减持，VC收益颇丰，获得了显著的正超额收益率和累计超额收益率；（3）VC减持之后，上市公司的创利和创现能力都显著下降，表明VC择机退出且并未发挥其强化公司治理的认证监督与提升公司价值的作用。总之，本文发现了我国VC的作用有别于国外的研究结论，在我国创业板上市公司的发展中，VC在介人时旨在“追求声誉”，在退出时旨在“追逐利益”，不仅赢得了“成功上市的神话”，也获得了“高额的收益”，可谓“名利双收”，但却忽略了对上市公司的监督和治理，给投资者造成重大损失。
흘금위지，풍험투자（간칭VC）재창업기업중적작용문제일직비수쟁의，국외학술계유량충절연불동적간법：일시“인증감독”；이시“추구성예”。본문통과수집아국창업판상시공사2009년10월-2011년12월적유관수거，운용실증분석방법탐토VC재아국창업기업중적작용여동궤。연구결과표명，총체상VC개입창업판상시공사적주요목적병비시발휘인증감독작용，이시주중추구성예，차강렬추축성예적동궤실질상시“추축리윤”。본문연구적주요결론시：（1）유VC개입적상시공사기상시수일절개솔현저고우몰유VC개입적상시공사，가견VC재창업기업중주중“추구성예”；（2）통과감지，VC수익파봉，획득료현저적정초액수익솔화루계초액수익솔；（3）VC감지지후，상시공사적창리화창현능력도현저하강，표명VC택궤퇴출차병미발휘기강화공사치리적인증감독여제승공사개치적작용。총지，본문발현료아국VC적작용유별우국외적연구결론，재아국창업판상시공사적발전중，VC재개인시지재“추구성예”，재퇴출시지재“추축이익”，불부영득료“성공상시적신화”，야획득료“고액적수익”，가위“명리쌍수”，단각홀략료대상시공사적감독화치리，급투자자조성중대손실。
The venture capital industry has been undergoing fast growth and expansion over the last decade. Venture capital, known as to play a crucial role in incubating new firms by supplying them with equity capital, has been widely discussed in financial literature. Theoretically, the extant research has evolved along two divergent paths. One research stream has concentrated on the certification role of venture capitalists in firms＇ initial public of- ferings. In order to retain access to the IPO market, venture capitalists have a strong incentive to establish a trustwor-thy reputation and therefore can perform the function of certificating the quality of the IPOs which result in significant- ly lower initial returns than the nonventure capital backed IPOs （Megginson and Weiss, 1991 ）. A second researchstream has suggested that venture capitalists grandstand in firms＇ initial public offerings. Because when venture cap- ital firms are young,they may have a strong incentive to establish a reputation and successfully raise capital for new funds. So companies backed by young venture capital firms would be underpriced more at IPOs than those of established venture capital finns （Gompers ,1996 ;Francis and Hasan,2001 ;Smarta and Zutter,2003 ;Lee and Waha1,2004）. In China, financial cases also make researchers and investors puzzle about the role of venture capital. For exam- ple,the venture capital backed IPOs has higher mean initial returns than the nonventure capital backed IPOs, and both the accounting and market performance go bad once the venture capitalists reduce their holdings. These evi- dences suggest that companies backed by venture capital do not perform better than those not backed by venture capital, and that venture capital may not certificate the quality of companies. Therefore, in order to figure out the real role and motivation of venture capital in the listed companies, we design the research to address this issue by mainly analyzing venture capitalists＇ backing and exit behaviors in the listed companies on China＇ s growth enterprise mar- ket which is created for the small and high-tech firms and can provide a natural quasi-experiment for us to examine the behaviors of venture capitalists. To examine the impact and motivation venture capital can have on the listed firms, we take the empirical tests for a sample of 152 initial public offerings （IPOs） from October 2009 to December 2011. The empirical results show that venture capital in the listed companies do not play the role of certification but grandstanding, and the deeper motivation of grandstanding is to pursuit for profit. The detailed results are shown as follows. First, a comparison ofventure capital backed IPOs with nonventure capital backed IPOs indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly higher initial returns, which is consistent with the holdings grands ,venture capitalists have gained highly significant abnormal tanding hypothesis. Second, by reducing their returns and average cumulated abnormal re- turns, which is particularly higher for the venture capitalists who have sent more board directors and supervisors to the listed companies. Third, after venture capital＇ s exit, the profit and cash indicator of the company decrease signif- icantly, which means venture capitalists not only have the ability to timing the exit, but also do not provide valuable service and corporate governance for the companies. Our paper contributes to a growing number of studies on the role and motivation of venture capital in Chinese listed companies. Our results that venture capital＇ s backing for the grandstanding and exit for the fortune are quite different with previous research which focus on venture capital＇ s role of either certification or grandstanding and do not examine the deeper motivation of pursuing profit. In all, capitalists gain not only the success myth but also the huge paying less attention to corporate governance, which in fact from backing to the IPO and the successful exit, venture fortune. However, this may result in venture capitalists＇ may lead to serious investment loss of the investors.