CAJ | 학술논문

以博弈论为理论基础，构建了研发补贴与污染排放税收下的企业研发模型，研究了减排目标下企业的最优研发水平、最优研发补贴和最优污染排放税收。研究结果显示：适当的污染排放税收有利于企业研发投入和产量的提高；研发补贴不会对企业的研发投入产生“排挤效应”，可以较大程度上提高企业研发投入的积极性；企业对环境的污染需控制在社会可接受收的范围内，否则，企业的生产活动会被政府停止。
이박혁론위이론기출，구건료연발보첩여오염배방세수하적기업연발모형，연구료감배목표하기업적최우연발수평、최우연발보첩화최우오염배방세수。연구결과현시：괄당적오염배방세수유리우기업연발투입화산량적제고；연발보첩불회대기업적연발투입산생“배제효응”，가이교대정도상제고기업연발투입적적겁성；기업대배경적오염수공제재사회가접수수적범위내，부칙，기업적생산활동회피정부정지。
On the basis of game theory, an enterprise R＆D model under conditions of R＆D subsidy and pollution emission tax has been constructed. With the goal of emission reduction, optimal R＆D level, optimal R＆D subsidy, and optimal pollution emission tax for the enterprises are studied. The research results show that appropriate emission tax is of benefit to the improvement of the R＆D investment and output of enterprises ; the R＆D subsidy is able to eliminate the effect of push aside and improve the R＆D investment greatly. The environment pollution must be controlled in the scope of social acceptable; otherwise, the enterprise production activities will be ultimately stopped by the government.