CAJ | 학술논문

从经济学的理论出发，分析了城市湖泊被污染的原因。从城市湖泊公共资源的性质入手，构造了政府与企业之间的完全信息静态博弈模型。分析了决策主体在决策过程中各方互相合作、互相制约的规律，探讨了不同约束条件下导致的不同的博弈均衡结果，进而提出了减少城市湖泊污染的对策建议，为我国在加速推进的工业化城市化进程中保护湖泊水环境提供参考。
종경제학적이론출발，분석료성시호박피오염적원인。종성시호박공공자원적성질입수，구조료정부여기업지간적완전신식정태박혁모형。분석료결책주체재결책과정중각방호상합작、호상제약적규률，탐토료불동약속조건하도치적불동적박혁균형결과，진이제출료감소성시호박오염적대책건의，위아국재가속추진적공업화성시화진정중보호호박수배경제공삼고。
The paper analyzed the causes of pollution of the urban lakes in China. Because the urban lake is a kind of common resource, it structured the model of complete information static game between the government and enterprises who pollute the lakes. It analysed the rules of cooperation and restriction of them. It concluded that the different conditions of the initial conditions will lead to the different game equilibriums. So it came up with the suggestion to the policy at present at the end of this paper. It will make a contribution to protect the lake resources from being contaminated during the progress of industrialization of our country.