CAJ | 학술논문

为弥补Bos等人（2008）忽视内部因素对无意识思维作用的研究缺陷，本研究从知识迁移视角提出无意识思维受内部知识与外部任务目标双重导向的观点。结果发现：（1）无意识思维知识的迁移促进了无意识思维效应；（2）在无意识思维知识与任务目标双导向下，无意识思维效应更强。基于上述研究，我们更一般地认为，无意识思维效应是内部因素（如，知识、兴趣、动机等）与外部因素（如，任务目标）共同作用的结果。
위미보Bos등인（2008）홀시내부인소대무의식사유작용적연구결함，본연구종지식천이시각제출무의식사유수내부지식여외부임무목표쌍중도향적관점。결과발현：（1）무의식사유지식적천이촉진료무의식사유효응；（2）재무의식사유지식여임무목표쌍도향하，무의식사유효응경강。기우상술연구，아문경일반지인위，무의식사유효응시내부인소（여，지식、흥취、동궤등）여외부인소（여，임무목표）공동작용적결과。
From the perspective of knowledge transfer, this research makes up for the weaknesses made by Bos et al. （2008） who ig- nored the effect of internal factors on unconscious thought. This study suggests that the unconscious thought is both unconscious thought knowledge-dependent and external goal-dependent. There are two experiments to demonstrate this. Experiment 1 investigated whether unconscious thought is knowledge-dependent. A total of 96 participants were randomly assigned to two groups, one group with knowledge-learning （participants who learned Dijksterhuis＇s unconscious thought theory） and the other group without knowledge-learning. Then, all participants completed a car decision task in one of three thought conditions： immediate decision condition, conscious thought condition, and unconscious thought condition. We compared the different scores between condi- tions using a 2 （knowledge-dependence： yes, no） ×3 （thought conditions： immediate decision, conscious thought, unconscious thought） analysis of variance. The results showed that （ 1 ） the interaction between knowledge-dependence and thought conditions was significant, F（2,84） = 3.44, p 〈 . 05. （2） A simple effect of knowledge-dependence in unconscious thought condition （F（ 1,84） = 11.79, p = . 001 ） and conscious thought condition （F（ 1,84） = 5.38, p 〈 . 05） was also significant. In the condition of uncon- scious thought, participants with knowledge-learning （M = 15.80, SD = 2.18） performed better than participants without knowledge- learning （M = 8. 40, SD = 5.37, p 〈 . 05 ） ; in the condition of conscious thought, participants with knowledge-learning （ M = 9. 87, SD = 5.93） also performed better than participants without knowledge-learning （M = 4. 87, SD = 9. 35）, p 〈 . 05. （3） A simple effect of thought conditions in knowledge-learning （F（ 2,84） = 11.03, p = . 000） was significant. In the condition of knowl- edge-learning, participants who thought unconsciously （M = 15.80, SD = 2. 18） performed better than participants who thought con- sciously （M = 9. 87, SD = 5.93,p〈 .05） and participants who decided immediately （M = 5.73, SD = 5.85,p〈 .001）, and the latter two did not significantly differ （p 〉 . 05 ）. Experiment 2 investigated whether unconscious thought was double-directional in both knowledge and goal. Sixty participants were assigned to a group with knowledge-learning and the other group without knowledge-learning at random. Then, they were asked to a- chieve a car-roommate decision task. In this task, participants were either told that they would later be asked questions about the ears or they would later be asked questions about the roommates. At last, all participants rated the cars and roommates. We compared the dif- ferent scores between conditions using a 2 （ knowledge-dependence ： yes, no） x 2 （ goal-dependence ： yes, no） analysis of variance. The results showed that （ 1 ） the interaction between knowledge-dependence and goal-dependence was significant, F（ 1,58 ） = 5.92, p 〈 . 05. （2） The simple effect of knowledge-dependence in goal-dependence condition was significant, F（ 1 ,58 ） = 10. 03, p 〈 . 01. When they had a task goal, participants who learned unconscious thought theory （M = 12. 53, SD = 5.36） performed better than par- ticipants who didnt learn （ M = 8. 33, SD = 4. 09）, p 〈 . 01. （3） The simple effect of goal-dependence in knowledge-learning con- dition was significant, F（ 1,58） = 9.79, p 〈 . 01. In the condition of knowledge-learning, participants who had the goal to think un- consciously （M = 12. 53, SD = 5.36） performed better than participants who didnt have the goal （M = 8.63, SD = 4. 09）, p 〈 .01. The results of the two experiments have demonstrated that unconscious thought is dependent on both unconscious thought knowledge and goal.