CAJ | 학술논문

运用博弈理论，构建了不完全信息下中间商占主导的物联网信息服务定价模型。在供应商边际生产成本信息不完全的静态情况下，通过信息甄别合约，运用显示原理分析了实现均衡时的信息服务定价问题及双方的最优定价策略；运用Rubinstein的思想分析在不完全信息动态博弈下双方信息服务定价的均衡解以及各自最优定价策略。研究表明：在不完全信息静态下，中间商可通过制定合理的信息服务价格与对供应商的转移支付来降低供应商边际生产成本不确定所带来的风险，同时中间商与供应商应共同致力于提高信息服务质量以增加收益。在不完全信息动态下，中间商若想在第一阶段、供应商在第二阶段报价成功，应努力降低自己的边际成本，并希望对方对信息服务价格的期望值接近临界值。
운용박혁이론，구건료불완전신식하중간상점주도적물련망신식복무정개모형。재공응상변제생산성본신식불완전적정태정황하，통과신식견별합약，운용현시원리분석료실현균형시적신식복무정개문제급쌍방적최우정개책략；운용Rubinstein적사상분석재불완전신식동태박혁하쌍방신식복무정개적균형해이급각자최우정개책략。연구표명：재불완전신식정태하，중간상가통과제정합리적신식복무개격여대공응상적전이지부래강저공응상변제생산성본불학정소대래적풍험，동시중간상여공응상응공동치력우제고신식복무질량이증가수익。재불완전신식동태하，중간상약상재제일계단、공응상재제이계단보개성공，응노력강저자기적변제성본，병희망대방대신식복무개격적기망치접근림계치。
This paper proposes a dominant intermediary model in which it addresses the pricing of information service in the internet of things with incomplete information based on the game theory. When the service provider~ marginal cost of produc- tion is incomplete information, the equilibrium of information service pricing and optimal pricing strategies between the pro- vider and the intermediary are achieved by signal screening contracts and revelation principle. Based on the Rubinstein＇s ideology, it also analyzes the equilibrium pricing of information service under the dynamic game of incomplete information for both and their respective optimal pricing strategy. Result shows that the intermediary can make reasonable price for informa- tion services and transfer payments to service provider to reduce the risk with incomplete information. Meanwhile, the inter- mediary and the service provider should work together to improve the quality of information service in order to increase reve- nue. With the dynamic game of incomplete information, if the quote of intermediary in the first stage and provider in the sec- ond stage is accepted for the other party, it should strive to lower their marginal costs and also hope that the information serv- ice price expectation of other party near the critical value.