CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过建立电力产业规制模型来探讨垄断的电力产业促进中国经济增长的具体机制。我们发现，相对于无规制的独家垄断状态，规制者通过降低垄断者的电价和利润来实现经济增长的目标，但是不完美监督则造成了“双赢互换型”规制失效和小工商业用户对耗电大户的交叉补贴，这构成了电网高收入的主要来源。经验证据进一步证明了本文提出的理论命题，最后，我们总结提出了中国的电力产业规制理论，并对现行的电力产业改革路径进行了反思。
본문통과건립전력산업규제모형래탐토롱단적전력산업촉진중국경제증장적구체궤제。아문발현，상대우무규제적독가롱단상태，규제자통과강저롱단자적전개화리윤래실현경제증장적목표，단시불완미감독칙조성료“쌍영호환형”규제실효화소공상업용호대모전대호적교차보첩，저구성료전망고수입적주요래원。경험증거진일보증명료본문제출적이론명제，최후，아문총결제출료중국적전력산업규제이론，병대현행적전력산업개혁로경진행료반사。
A regulation model is set up to explore the mechanism by which the electricity industry accelerates economic growth. We find that the regulator lower the price and profit of the monopolist to realize economic growth compared to the mo- nopolist without regulation. However, imperfect supervision leads to ＂two-win exchange＂ regulation failure and cross-subsidy from small business to larger consumer, which comprises the source of high income in Grid. Empirical test further prove the theory we raise in this thesis. Finally, we summarize the theory on electricity industry in China and reconsider the path of the existing reformation path of the electricity industry.