CAJ | 학술논문

本文以2010年沪深主板上市公司为研究样本，运用Logstie回归模型对控制权配置与股权激励偏好的关系进行分析，研究结果表明：（1）实际控制人性质中民企的上市公司股权激励偏好高；（2）第一大股东控制力强的上市公司股权激励偏好低；（3）两职合一的上市公司股权激励偏好高；（4）股权集中度、高管持股比例高的上市公司股权激励偏好高。
본문이2010년호심주판상시공사위연구양본，운용Logstie회귀모형대공제권배치여고권격려편호적관계진행분석，연구결과표명：（1）실제공제인성질중민기적상시공사고권격려편호고；（2）제일대고동공제력강적상시공사고권격려편호저；（3）량직합일적상시공사고권격려편호고；（4）고권집중도、고관지고비례고적상시공사고권격려편호고。
Based on the listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange Markets in 2010 , by using the logistic regression models analyzed the relationship between the configuration of control rights and the preference of equity incentive, the findings show that ：（ 1 ） private companies prefer equity incentive more than State-owned companies ; （2） the companies with the first shareholders who have stronger control power don＇t prefer equity incentive; （3） there exist stronger equity incentive preference in the companies whose board chairman has the dual position with the general manager; （4） the higher concentration of the ownership and shareholding of manager lead to higher preference to equity incentive.