CAJ | 학술논문

本文以2004～2006年非金融行业上市公司为样本，将管理层与股东、终极控制人与中小股东之间的代理冲突置于同一框架下，考察管理层激励与股权融资成本的关系，以及这种关系是否会受到终极控制人与中小股东之间代理冲突的影响；进一步结合终极控制人性质，检验管理者权力对股权融资成本的直接负面影响及对管理层激励与股权融资成本关系的影响。实证研究发现：管理层货币薪酬激励有助于降低股权融资成本，而管理层持股比例对股权融资成本没有显著影响。终极控制人的两权分离程度及管理者权力均弱化了管理层激励对股权融资成本的降低效应，而终极控制人的现金流权则对管理层激励与股权融资成本的负相关关系具有强化作用，且终极控制人的政府性质对管理者权力所产生的负面影响有抑制作用。
본문이2004～2006년비금융행업상시공사위양본，장관리층여고동、종겁공제인여중소고동지간적대리충돌치우동일광가하，고찰관리층격려여고권융자성본적관계，이급저충관계시부회수도종겁공제인여중소고동지간대리충돌적영향；진일보결합종겁공제인성질，검험관리자권력대고권융자성본적직접부면영향급대관리층격려여고권융자성본관계적영향。실증연구발현：관리층화폐신수격려유조우강저고권융자성본，이관리층지고비례대고권융자성본몰유현저영향。종겁공제인적량권분리정도급관리자권력균약화료관리층격려대고권융자성본적강저효응，이종겁공제인적현금류권칙대관리층격려여고권융자성본적부상관관계구유강화작용，차종겁공제인적정부성질대관리자권력소산생적부면영향유억제작용。
Based on the data of Chinese non - financial listed companies from 2004 to 2006, and placing the agency conflicts between management and shareholders, the ultimate controller and minority shareholders in a framework, this pa- per investigates the relationship between management incentives and the cost of equity capital, and examines whether this relationship is influenced by the agency conflict between the ultimate controller and minority shareholders. Combined with the nature of the firms＇ ultimate controller,it further investigates whether the cost of equity capital itself and the relation- ship between management incentives and the cost of equity capital is influenced by managerial power. Empirical results show that managers＇ monetary compensation helps reduce the cost of equity capital, while manager＇s ownership of equity has no significant effects on the cost of equity capital. The degree of separation of two rights of ultimate controller and manage- rial power weakens the effect of management incentives on lowering the cost of equity capital. While the cash - flow rights of ultimate controller enhances the negative correlation between management incentive and the cost of equity capital. And the government identity of ultimate controller can inhibit the negative impact of the manager＇s power on the cost of equity capital.