CAJ | 학술논문

自由现金流是企业生产经营活动产生的，在满足净现值大于零的项目所需资金后的现金流。现代企业所有权和经营权分离，经理人往往从自身利益最大化角度出发进行企业的经营管理活动，从而出现了委托代理问题，产生了高昂的代理成本。自由现金流的存在增加了经理人员可自由支配的现金，可能会加剧委托代理问题。本文从在职消费的视角，检验自由现金流的代理成本效应。选取2007～2010年沪市上市公司数据，实证检验我国上市公司尤其是国有上市公司自由现金流量和在职消费程度的关系，并考察在职消费与企业绩效的相关性。为完善公司治理结构、合理约束代理人行为提供政策建议。
자유현금류시기업생산경영활동산생적，재만족정현치대우령적항목소수자금후적현금류。현대기업소유권화경영권분리，경리인왕왕종자신이익최대화각도출발진행기업적경영관리활동，종이출현료위탁대리문제，산생료고앙적대리성본。자유현금류적존재증가료경리인원가자유지배적현금，가능회가극위탁대리문제。본문종재직소비적시각，검험자유현금류적대리성본효응。선취2007～2010년호시상시공사수거，실증검험아국상시공사우기시국유상시공사자유현금류량화재직소비정도적관계，병고찰재직소비여기업적효적상관성。위완선공사치리결구、합리약속대리인행위제공정책건의。
Free cash flow （FCF） is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. Jensen published a treatise named ＂Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers＂ in 1986, puts forward FCF agency costs hypothesis, opened the link between FCF and agency costs, corporate governance. Because of the separation of ownership and manage- ment rights in modem enterprise, managers always make their own benefit maximization, and then resulting in the principal-agent problem and high agency costs. Managers have an incentive to use FCF for the excessive invest- ment, low efficiency acquisitions and discretionary revenue expenditure, and cause the decline in corporate per- formance finally. Is Jensen＇s agency costs hypothesis exists in the real China？ How to control the Chinese state- owned enterprises＇ FCF reasonably; reduce position-related consumption and over-investment in senior manage- ment; and improve corporate performance, which becomes common issues need to address in the field of finance and corporate governance. This paper selected the sample of 2007 ~ 2010 Shanghai-listed company data, and em- pirically tested the correlation between FCF and position-related consumption, corporate performance in China＇s lis- ted companies. On this basis, the paper proposed the policy recommendations of optimization and control of FCF, and improvement of the corporate governance structure. From the study, we could see that Companies hold certain cash flow, indicating that companies have the ability to reward investors and selfvmanagement, but because incon- sistent with the objectives and information asymmetry between business owners and operators, there is differences in using FCF. Excess cash flow can often make the executives more easily for personal gain or the lack of due care and full consideration in disposing cash flow. At the same time as the management contract in China is not perfect, the manager market is not mature, corporate executives tend to choose position-related consumer as self-motivation. From this empirical study we found high levels of FCF does lead to a more serious level of position-related consump- tion, and the higher level of position-related consumption, the more conducive to improvement of corporate perform- mace. Corporate excess liquidity has brought hazards to the business efficiency. Based on the above analysis, the paper argues that we can view from the perspective of the following measures, reasonable constraint agent behavior and improve the corporate governance structure, in order to improve corporate performance. （1） Standard state capital budget, set reasonable proportion of SOE paid dividends. SOE profit in our country didn＇ t handed over or be handed over to the low proportion for a long time, which not only contributes to over-investment enterprises, en- largement of discretionary spending, and corruption, but also maintain and strengthen the monopoly of state-owned enterprises, resulting in a huge net loss of social welfare. So we must adjust the proportion of corporate profits paid （30% -50% ） according to classification and grading , especially for the central state-owned enterprises, and regu- late the use scope. （2） Incentive compatibility. China＇s enterprises can take the restricted stock options and sub- scription rights for effective long-term incentives on senior executives, so the owner could transfer of part of the re- sidual claim to the executives, and make it symmetrical between the benefits and risks, which will organically links executives personal interests and business interests, maintain a reasonable level of FCF, reduce agency costs and improve business efficiency. （3） Enhance the effectiveness of the disclosure. In addition to traditional forms of written disclosure, such as business prospectus and annual reports, we can also use the network for convenient and rapid information disclosure, investors and strategic partners can get the latest information at any time. Improve- ment of the transparency and accuracy of information disclosure can help corporate executives to reduce self-mo- tives, so that business owners could constraint the agency costs of FCF. （4） Enhanced media monitoring. The effi- cient media can promote the management to regulate their own behaviors, make improving business performance as a priority.