CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过建立电力规制模型来重点分析电网市场势力的形成机制，影响因素和经验测度。研究发现，不完美监督造成了“双赢互换型”规制失效和小工商业用户对耗电大户的交叉补贴，而区域异质，重复博弈，政绩考核多元化和工业结构的重型化倾向则会加剧“规制弱化效应”，从而增强电网的市场势力，提高其对于小工商业用户的电价水平，“厂网分开”的改革能否降低电网的市场势力则取决于竞价上网能否有效开展。在理论分析的基础上，我们提出了测算电网市场势力的方法和指标，并设计了一种电力产业改革的新思路：输配一体、售电竞争、有效接入、促进转型。
본문통과건립전력규제모형래중점분석전망시장세력적형성궤제，영향인소화경험측도。연구발현，불완미감독조성료“쌍영호환형”규제실효화소공상업용호대모전대호적교차보첩，이구역이질，중복박혁，정적고핵다원화화공업결구적중형화경향칙회가극“규제약화효응”，종이증강전망적시장세력，제고기대우소공상업용호적전개수평，“엄망분개”적개혁능부강저전망적시장세력칙취결우경개상망능부유효개전。재이론분석적기출상，아문제출료측산전망시장세력적방법화지표，병설계료일충전력산업개혁적신사로：수배일체、수전경쟁、유효접입、촉진전형。
A regulation model is established to analyze growth and dilemma during the reformation of China＇s electricity industry. The formation mechanism, influence factors and measure of power grid market power in China is discussed in detail. We find that the regulator lower the price and profit of power grid enterprise to develop economy. However, imperfect supervision leads to ＂win-win exchange＂ regulation failure and cross-subsidy from small customers to large departments. It is also found that regional disparity, repeated games, and industrial structure will aggravate regulation failure. Whether ＂structure separation＂ lowers market power depends on the net price. Next, we raise the methods on how to measure market power, and design a new way to reform electricity industry.