CAJ | 학술논문

基于合谋理论构建了科技财政经费监管中各主体合谋行为的博弈模型并对科技财政经费监管中的合谋活动进行分析。结果表明：治理科技财政经费监管中的合谋活动，关键是加大对合谋主体的惩罚力度，提高政府的监管质量，制定完善的经费监管办法。并提出合谋瓦解机制设计思路：一是构建科技经费监管方合理激励与约束机制；二是构建有效监管处罚机制，加大合谋惩罚成本；三是完善制衡式监管制度，瓦解合谋行为。
기우합모이론구건료과기재정경비감관중각주체합모행위적박혁모형병대과기재정경비감관중적합모활동진행분석。결과표명：치이과기재정경비감관중적합모활동，관건시가대대합모주체적징벌력도，제고정부적감관질량，제정완선적경비감관판법。병제출합모와해궤제설계사로：일시구건과기경비감관방합리격려여약속궤제；이시구건유효감관처벌궤제，가대합모징벌성본；삼시완선제형식감관제도，와해합모행위。
According to the collusion and game theory, a game model about the gambling behaviors in the scientific financial appropriation supervision was constructed and analyzed. The result of the game analysis demonstrated that the key of collusion-overthrow in Appropriation Supervision is increasing sanctions to the main body, as well as improving the quality of government regulation, drawing up im- peccable regulatory measures. The mechanism design of collusion-overthrow is as follows： first, con- structing reasonable incentive and restraint mechanisms of the auditor; second, constructing effective and reasonable punishment mechanism of appropriation supervision to increase the collusion cost; and third, improving the scientific financial