CAJ | 학술논문

中央政府强激励下的地方政府竞争是中国经济在过去30年快速增长关键原因。通过分析一个多任务的委托代理模型可以发现：首先，中央政府对于GDP数量增加的强激励会减弱地方政府进行其他任务的努力，从而带来偏离社会最优的扭曲。其次，中央政府的最优激励程度应随着经济的发展水平的提高而降低。因此，在现阶段的经济落后地区，继续实施以GDP数量增长为主要考核目标的强激励是可行的；但对于经济发达地区，中央政府应大幅度降低对GDP数量增长的激励。讨论了中央政府向地方政府在GDP数量增长和GDP质量提高两个方面同时提供较强激励的可能性，并给出了相关政策建议。
중앙정부강격려하적지방정부경쟁시중국경제재과거30년쾌속증장관건원인。통과분석일개다임무적위탁대리모형가이발현：수선，중앙정부대우GDP수량증가적강격려회감약지방정부진행기타임무적노력，종이대래편리사회최우적뉴곡。기차，중앙정부적최우격려정도응수착경제적발전수평적제고이강저。인차，재현계단적경제락후지구，계속실시이GDP수량증장위주요고핵목표적강격려시가행적；단대우경제발체지구，중앙정부응대폭도강저대GDP수량증장적격려。토론료중앙정부향지방정부재GDP수량증장화GDP질량제고량개방면동시제공교강격려적가능성，병급출료상관정책건의。
Competition among local governments motivated by the central government has been considered to be a key reason for China＇ s rapid economic growth in the recent 30 years. By analyzing a muhi-task principle-agent model, we find that a strong motivation for increasing GDP in quantity will certainly cause a distortion compared with the first-best; the optimal amount of the motivation depends on the level of the economic development. The motivation should be strong in the less developed area and it should be lessened in the more developed area. We also offer some suggestions for the central government on how to maintain strong motivations for both increasing GDP in quantity and improving GDP＇ s quality simultaneously at the present stage.