CAJ | 학술논문

本文结合中国制度背景，从代理成本视角理论推演所有权和控制权的分离度、投资者法律保护与公司价值之间关系，使用非金融上市公司面板数据，应用一系列广义最小二乘法（GLS）经验调查所有权和控制权的分离度，投资者法律保护如何影响公司价值，以及及投资者法律保护如何影响所有权和控制权的分离度与公司价值之间的关系。研究结果表明，（1）所有权和控制权的分离度与公司价值显著负相关，表明所有权和控制权的分离度越高，代理成本越高，公司价值越低；（2）投资者法律保护与公司价值显著正相关，表明投资者法律保护在减缓公司代理冲突中扮演着重要角色；（3）所有权和控制权的分离度与投资者法律保护的交互项的系数显著为正的，表明投资者法律保护水平的提高能削弱所有权和控制权的分离度与公司价值之间的负相关关系。
본문결합중국제도배경，종대리성본시각이론추연소유권화공제권적분리도、투자자법률보호여공사개치지간관계，사용비금융상시공사면판수거，응용일계렬엄의최소이승법（GLS）경험조사소유권화공제권적분리도，투자자법률보호여하영향공사개치，이급급투자자법률보호여하영향소유권화공제권적분리도여공사개치지간적관계。연구결과표명，（1）소유권화공제권적분리도여공사개치현저부상관，표명소유권화공제권적분리도월고，대리성본월고，공사개치월저；（2）투자자법률보호여공사개치현저정상관，표명투자자법률보호재감완공사대리충돌중분연착중요각색；（3）소유권화공제권적분리도여투자자법률보호적교호항적계수현저위정적，표명투자자법률보호수평적제고능삭약소유권화공제권적분리도여공사개치지간적부상관관계。
Integrating institutional background of China, the paper theoretically deduced the relationship between ownership- control rights divergence, investor legal protection and corporate value from perspective of agency cost. Then it adopted panel data of non-financial listed companies in China and applied series of generalized least square （GLS） to empirically investigate how ownership-control rights divergence, and investor legal protection affects corporate value, and how investor legal protection affects the relationship between ownership-control rights divergence and corporate value. The results show that：（1） ownership- control rights divergence is negatively correlated with corporate value, which indicates that the higher ownership-control rights divergence, the higher agency cost and lower corporate value; （2） investor legal protection is positively correlated with corporate value, which indicates that investor legal protection plays an important role in mitigating agency conflicts; （3） the coefficient of interaction item of ownership-control rights divergence and investor legal protection is significantly positive, which indicates that improvement of the level of investor legal protection can weaken the negative relationship between ownership-control rights divergence and corporate value.