金融研究
金融研究
금융연구
Journal of Financial Research
2012年
12期
67~81
,共null页
邵新建 巫和懋 江萍 薛熠 王勇
邵新建 巫和懋 江萍 薛熠 王勇
소신건 무화무 강평 설습 왕용
房价泡沫 地方政府 垄断陛土地市场
房價泡沫 地方政府 壟斷陛土地市場
방개포말 지방정부 롱단폐토지시장
House price bubble, Local government, Monopolistic land market
2004年以来,中国大中城市房价加速上涨,逐渐形成难以调控的“坚硬泡沫”。本文研究发现:地方政府对城市土地市场的垄断正是泡沫的主要“硬核”之一。随着各市县土地收购储备机构的普遍成立以及“招拍挂”土地出让方式的强力推行,原来实际为多头、分散供给的城市土地市场逐渐转变为地方政府控制下的垄断性市场。理论模型表明:如果地方政府以土地收益最大化为决策目标,则其理性选择就是通过控制土地供给量推高城市土地价格,而经过房地产开发企业的竞争,高地价将最终传导形成高房价。通过投资者的“预期成本效应”,由竞价市场产生的高地价信号将立即拉高当期房价。实证研究支持上述理论假说。这意味着要抑制房价的过快上涨,长期治本之策在于打破城市土地市场的垄断格局,中短期来看,需要激励地方政府改变其以土地收益最大化为主要决策目标的做法。
2004年以來,中國大中城市房價加速上漲,逐漸形成難以調控的“堅硬泡沫”。本文研究髮現:地方政府對城市土地市場的壟斷正是泡沫的主要“硬覈”之一。隨著各市縣土地收購儲備機構的普遍成立以及“招拍掛”土地齣讓方式的彊力推行,原來實際為多頭、分散供給的城市土地市場逐漸轉變為地方政府控製下的壟斷性市場。理論模型錶明:如果地方政府以土地收益最大化為決策目標,則其理性選擇就是通過控製土地供給量推高城市土地價格,而經過房地產開髮企業的競爭,高地價將最終傳導形成高房價。通過投資者的“預期成本效應”,由競價市場產生的高地價信號將立即拉高噹期房價。實證研究支持上述理論假說。這意味著要抑製房價的過快上漲,長期治本之策在于打破城市土地市場的壟斷格跼,中短期來看,需要激勵地方政府改變其以土地收益最大化為主要決策目標的做法。
2004년이래,중국대중성시방개가속상창,축점형성난이조공적“견경포말”。본문연구발현:지방정부대성시토지시장적롱단정시포말적주요“경핵”지일。수착각시현토지수구저비궤구적보편성립이급“초박괘”토지출양방식적강력추행,원래실제위다두、분산공급적성시토지시장축점전변위지방정부공제하적롱단성시장。이론모형표명:여과지방정부이토지수익최대화위결책목표,칙기이성선택취시통과공제토지공급량추고성시토지개격,이경과방지산개발기업적경쟁,고지개장최종전도형성고방개。통과투자자적“예기성본효응”,유경개시장산생적고지개신호장립즉랍고당기방개。실증연구지지상술이론가설。저의미착요억제방개적과쾌상창,장기치본지책재우타파성시토지시장적롱단격국,중단기래간,수요격려지방정부개변기이토지수익최대화위주요결책목표적주법。
Since 2004, the house price has been accelerating the rising speed in the large and medium - sized cities of China. As a result, the hard bubble gradually appears which is immune to various macroeconomic policies. This paper finds that one of the hard cores in this bubble is the monopoly power of local government in the city land market. With the establishment of land banks in cities and the compulsory implement of ' tender, auction and listing' method of land grant, the former competitive city land market was gradually substituted by the monopoly market controlled by local government. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that local government's rational selection is to push up land price by decreasing the land supply if its object is to maximize the land profit. By the competition of real estate developers, the higher house price will be formed on the basis of higher land price. Furthermore, through the investor expectations on land cost of house, the high land price signal will lead to one high house price. Empirical study supports above hypothesis. According to our research, in order to slow down the rising speed of house price, the fundamental policy is to change the monopoly land market into a competitive market. In the short run, local government should be motivated to change its objective of land profit maximization.