CAJ | 학술논문

为减少公共服务外包中的逆向选择问题，本文建立了利用“招标价格上限”及“报酬给付方式”两个基本报酬工具来对承包商信息进行综合考量的两阶段信息甄别机制。在这种机制下，政府可以通过合理设定招标价格上限来对承包商进行初步筛选，并通过设计不同报酬给付方式完成对剩余竞标承包商的进一步甄别。研究表明，当政府将招标价格上限设置在其所能接受的高成本承包商成本和保留效用之和的水平上，并设计一组具有不同奖惩系数的合同供竞标承包商选择时，政府能够实现对承包商的有效甄别。
위감소공공복무외포중적역향선택문제，본문건립료이용“초표개격상한”급“보수급부방식”량개기본보수공구래대승포상신식진행종합고량적량계단신식견별궤제。재저충궤제하，정부가이통과합리설정초표개격상한래대승포상진행초보사선，병통과설계불동보수급부방식완성대잉여경표승포상적진일보견별。연구표명，당정부장초표개격상한설치재기소능접수적고성본승포상성본화보류효용지화적수평상，병설계일조구유불동장징계수적합동공경표승포상선택시，정부능구실현대승포상적유효견별。
This paper established a two-stage screening mechanism to reduce adverse selection in public service outsourcing by using two basic payment tools ＂bidding price cap＂ and ＂payment method＂ . Under this mechanism, the government sets the bidding price cap on a reasonable level first, and then provides contractors with a series of contracts which differ in payment methods. To make the mechanism work, the bidding price cap must equal to the sum of the highest cost which the government can stand and the contractors＇ reservation utility, and the contracts must have different reward coefficient and penalty coefficient.