CAJ | 학술논문

研究了专利保护下制造商授权经销商再制造的特殊闭环供应链。在新产品和再制造品存在差异的情况下,建立了分散决策与联合决策情形下的闭环供应链博弈模型,得出了制造商的最优批发价格和专利许可费、经销商对新产品和再制造产品的差异定价以及双方的最优利润,并分析了不同参数变化对价格、回收率和利润的影响。最后,采用收益分享合同实现了许可经销商再制造的闭环供应链协调。
연구료전리보호하제조상수권경소상재제조적특수폐배공응련。재신산품화재제조품존재차이적정황하,건립료분산결책여연합결책정형하적폐배공응련박혁모형,득출료제조상적최우비발개격화전리허가비、경소상대신산품화재제조산품적차이정개이급쌍방적최우리윤,병분석료불동삼수변화대개격、회수솔화리윤적영향。최후,채용수익분향합동실현료허가경소상재제조적폐배공응련협조。
A special closed-loop supply chain is discussed.In such a supply chain,under patent perfect market,retailers＇ remanufacturing of patented products is authorized by the original manufacturer.For the case that difference exists between the new products and remanufactured products,game theory models are developed under both decentralized and centralized decision-making modes.With the models,manufacturer＇s optimal wholesale price and patent licensing fee,retailer＇s price difference between new and remanufactured products,and their profits are then found for both decision-making modes.Impacts of different parameter changes on pricing,patent licensing fee,and profits are also analyzed.It shows that system profit under decentralized decision-making is less than that under centralized decision-making.Therefore,a revenue sharing contract is presented to coordinate the supply chain.