CAJ | 학술논문

本文以红利上缴为背景，研究国有企业经理人的激励问题。将红利上缴后留存的利润视为对国有企业经理人的一种激励，通过构建只具有生产任务和同时具有生产、在职消费双重任务的委托代理模型，研究红利上缴与国有企业经理人激励之间的权衡。模型研究表明．激励强度与能力系数正相关，与风险规避程度、外部环境不确定性、成本系数负相关．在职消费与生产性努力此消彼长，这为红利上缴政策设计提供了依据。基于上市公司的计量分析发现：提高分红比例确实会损害企业经营绩效，因此在提高红利上缴比例时．应加快完善国有企业经理人激励制度，加强对在职消费等不良行为的监管力度。
본문이홍리상격위배경，연구국유기업경리인적격려문제。장홍리상격후류존적리윤시위대국유기업경리인적일충격려，통과구건지구유생산임무화동시구유생산、재직소비쌍중임무적위탁대리모형，연구홍리상격여국유기업경리인격려지간적권형。모형연구표명．격려강도여능력계수정상관，여풍험규피정도、외부배경불학정성、성본계수부상관．재직소비여생산성노력차소피장，저위홍리상격정책설계제공료의거。기우상시공사적계량분석발현：제고분홍비례학실회손해기업경영적효，인차재제고홍리상격비례시．응가쾌완선국유기업경리인격려제도，가강대재직소비등불량행위적감관력도。
Based on the background of dividend payout, this paper studies the incentives of the managers of SOE. Considering the retained profits after dividend payout as an incentive for managers of SOE, the paper studies the trade-off between the dividend and the incentive to the managers of SOE, by constructing principal-agent theory models of production-only task and production added on-duty consumption dual task. The model studies have shown that the incentive strength is positively correlated with ability coefficient, while negatively correlated with the degree of risk aversion, the uncertainty of the external environment and the cost coefficient, and that on- duty consumption and productive effort are counter-balance, which provides the basis for the policy design of dividend payout. Based on the listed company＇s econometric analysis found that, raising the dividend ratio indeed can damage the enterprises＇ operating performance, so during increasing the ratio, we should accelerate the improvement of SOE managers＇ incentive system and strengthen the supervision of the on-duty consumption and other undesirable behaviors. Structural cutoff point test also shows that the dividend ratio of SOE still has a considerable space for increasing.