CAJ | 학술논문

定向增发是否存在控股股东掏空行为近年来颇受争议。以2006—2009年实施定向增发的上市公司作为样本，可对定向增发过程中是否存在控股股东掏空行为，以及控股股东掏空行为的表现形式进行研究。研究发现：相比较对机构投资者的定向增发，对控股股东定向增发的折价率显著更高；控股股东对上市公司定向增发的时机选择，是导致不同增发对象发行折价率差异的重要原因；控股股东对上市公司定向增发前的停牌操控，是导致不同增发对象发行折价率差异的又一原因。研究结果证实了定向增发过程中确实存在控股股东掏空行为。
정향증발시부존재공고고동도공행위근년래파수쟁의。이2006—2009년실시정향증발적상시공사작위양본，가대정향증발과정중시부존재공고고동도공행위，이급공고고동도공행위적표현형식진행연구。연구발현：상비교대궤구투자자적정향증발，대공고고동정향증발적절개솔현저경고；공고고동대상시공사정향증발적시궤선택，시도치불동증발대상발행절개솔차이적중요원인；공고고동대상시공사정향증발전적정패조공，시도치불동증발대상발행절개솔차이적우일원인。연구결과증실료정향증발과정중학실존재공고고동도공행위。
Whether there is the phenomenon of tunneling in equity private placements has been a controversial issue in recent years. By analyzing samples from Chinese listed firms during the period 2006-2009, our study reveals that, com- pared with equity private placements to institutional investors, there are significantly higher discounts in equity private placements to controlling shareholders, that such different pricing behaviors arise at least partly from timing on equity pri- vate placements by controlling shareholders, and that another reason for such different issue pricing is the manipulation of temporal listing suspension before equity private placements by controlling shareholders. Our findings show that tunneling exists in the equity private placements.