CAJ | 학술논문

针对目前我国农户加入“农超对接”供应链意愿不足这一现实问题，首先，分析“农超对接”供应链的不完全契约特征；其次，构建了三种不同治理模式的数学模型，对比农户最优专用性投资水平的差异；最后，建立事后再协商的讨价还价动态博弈模型，研究影响农户专业性投资水平的因素。研究表明：以激励农户提高专用性投资水平作为标准，事后再协商模式将比事后不协商模式更具优势；如果农户预期到自己在事后再协商中会面临被“敲竹杠”的风险，将会降低事前的专用性投资水平；可以从改造农超双方不平衡的上下层结构关系入手，来激励农户提高专用性投资水平。
침대목전아국농호가입“농초대접”공응련의원불족저일현실문제，수선，분석“농초대접”공응련적불완전계약특정；기차，구건료삼충불동치리모식적수학모형，대비농호최우전용성투자수평적차이；최후，건립사후재협상적토개환개동태박혁모형，연구영향농호전업성투자수평적인소。연구표명：이격려농호제고전용성투자수평작위표준，사후재협상모식장비사후불협상모식경구우세；여과농호예기도자기재사후재협상중회면림피“고죽강”적풍험，장회강저사전적전용성투자수평；가이종개조농초쌍방불평형적상하층결구관계입수，래격려농호제고전용성투자수평。
Based on the problem that farmers are reluctant to join in the farmer-supermarket direct-pur- chase supply chain. Firstly, we depict the incomplete contract characteristics of the supply chain. Secondly, we construct three different governance models and compare the differences of farmers＇ optimal level of specific investment. Finally; we establish the bargaining dynamic game model to analyze factors affecting farmers＇ specific investment. The analysis shows that, after the re-negotiation mode has advan- tages over by motivating farmers to improve the specific investment levels as a standard. If the farmers expect to face the risk of the hold-up problem afterwards, they will reduce the advance level of specific investments. The farmers＇ specific investment can be improved through the transformation of the imbalance relationship between upper and lower sides.