CAJ | 학술논문

股权激励依据激励相容原理，为降低公司管理层的代理成本，俘获优质人力资本，激励核心人才而设计，属于薪酬的长期激励部分，其成败关系到公司高管激励约束机制的建设、薪酬制度的完善、企业的长远发展。在我国上市公司股权激励实践中，出现了实施条件过宽、业绩考核不严、预期收益失控、侵蚀股东和公司权益、高管离职减持股份等偏差，是公司经理人产生道德风险的表现。公司治理中的道德风险问题，既要依靠有效的激励机制，又要依靠内部监督、制衡和外部约束来防范。道德风险具有内生性、潜在性、控制艰巨性，单点防范、应急管理不能有效地化解这些问题，只有用全面风险管理的理念进行系统治理，才能有效抑制经理人道德风险的发生和扩散，释放股权激励的正能量．实现股权激励的本来目的。
고권격려의거격려상용원리，위강저공사관리층적대리성본，부획우질인력자본，격려핵심인재이설계，속우신수적장기격려부분，기성패관계도공사고관격려약속궤제적건설、신수제도적완선、기업적장원발전。재아국상시공사고권격려실천중，출현료실시조건과관、업적고핵불엄、예기수익실공、침식고동화공사권익、고관리직감지고빈등편차，시공사경리인산생도덕풍험적표현。공사치리중적도덕풍험문제，기요의고유효적격려궤제，우요의고내부감독、제형화외부약속래방범。도덕풍험구유내생성、잠재성、공제간거성，단점방범、응급관리불능유효지화해저사문제，지유용전면풍험관리적이념진행계통치리，재능유효억제경리인도덕풍험적발생화확산，석방고권격려적정능량．실현고권격려적본래목적。
Based on the incentive compatibility principle, the stock ownership incentive is designed to reduce the company management agency costs, capture the high quality human capital and encourage the enterprise core talents, which belongs to the long-term salary incentive. Its success or failure is directly related to the construction of company executive incentive and restraint mechanisms, the improvement of the salary system, and the long-term development of the enterprise. There appear some deviations of extensive implementing conditions, loose performance assessment, out-of-control expected profits, infringement of shareholder ＆ company equities, and management reduction of holding stocks in China, which are of the moral hazards of company managers. The moral hazard problems in corporate governance must be prevented by effective incentive mechanism, internal supervision and balancing as well as external constraints. By using the concept of comprehensive risk management to deal with the moral hazard, we can effectively restrain its occurrence and spread, release the positive energy of stock own- ership incentive, and realize the original purpose of the equity incentives.