CAJ | 학술논문

在交叉性理论单交叉特性假设下，论证了购买高档汽车带来的收益感明显高于购买低档汽车的收益感，证明了如果厂商不能采取完全价格歧视的定价策略，则与社会最优的情形相比，低档汽车的销售价格会更高，使得高档车的产量小于社会最优水平。在完全竞争的市场结构下。与社会最优的汽车生产量相比，高档汽车的生产量是过高，而低档汽车的生产量则是偏低的。研究发现，厂商在进行生产决策时完全不考虑高档汽车消费的外部效应，将外部效应内部化。因此，要实现社会最优的高档汽车与低档汽车的生产量，并纠正这种因外部性会引起的市场失灵，政府应该选择的政策是同时对高档汽车的生产和低档汽车的生产予以补贴。
재교차성이론단교차특성가설하，론증료구매고당기차대래적수익감명현고우구매저당기차적수익감，증명료여과엄상불능채취완전개격기시적정개책략，칙여사회최우적정형상비，저당기차적소수개격회경고，사득고당차적산량소우사회최우수평。재완전경쟁적시장결구하。여사회최우적기차생산량상비，고당기차적생산량시과고，이저당기차적생산량칙시편저적。연구발현，엄상재진행생산결책시완전불고필고당기차소비적외부효응，장외부효응내부화。인차，요실현사회최우적고당기차여저당기차적생산량，병규정저충인외부성회인기적시장실령，정부응해선택적정책시동시대고당기차적생산화저당기차적생산여이보첩。
Under the hypothesis of Single Crossing Condition of intcrscctionality theory, the paper compares and contrastcs the benefits of buying lux- ury car and of buying cheap car. It is find that the benefits luxury cars bring to its owner is significantly higher than purchasing cheap ones. It is proved that compare the socially optimal situation, the price of cheap ears are higher than it should be and the outputs of making luxury cars will be lower than it should be if the manufacturers are unable to take perfect price discrimination strategy. In a perfectly competitive market structure, comparing to tile socially optimal car production, luxury car production is too high, and cheap car production is low. The results show that while manufacturers do not take their externalities in the production decision when they make decisions. They prefer to turn the exterior effects into the interior effects. Thus, to achieve social optimum outputs of luxury cars and cheap cars avoiding market failure, the government of China should give subsidies to both luxury automobile production and cheap car production.