改革与战略
改革與戰略
개혁여전략
Reformation & Strategy
2013年
2期
30~36
,共null页
Tiebout模型 动态博弈 公共品供给 竞争机制
Tiebout模型 動態博弈 公共品供給 競爭機製
Tiebout모형 동태박혁 공공품공급 경쟁궤제
Tiebout Model; dynamic game; supply of public goods; competitive mechanism
公共品供给和社会选择存在效率难题。Tiebout模型通过在政府行为中引入竞争机制，完善群体偏好的显示性特征，是实现帕累托生产供给的前提条件。文章旨在通过理论模型及Besley动态博弈过程对居民、地方及中央政府的竞争行为进行模拟，分析公共资源达到效率化配置的长期均衡，进一步说明竞争机制能够限制政府行使权力造成的非效率。
公共品供給和社會選擇存在效率難題。Tiebout模型通過在政府行為中引入競爭機製，完善群體偏好的顯示性特徵，是實現帕纍託生產供給的前提條件。文章旨在通過理論模型及Besley動態博弈過程對居民、地方及中央政府的競爭行為進行模擬，分析公共資源達到效率化配置的長期均衡，進一步說明競爭機製能夠限製政府行使權力造成的非效率。
공공품공급화사회선택존재효솔난제。Tiebout모형통과재정부행위중인입경쟁궤제，완선군체편호적현시성특정，시실현파루탁생산공급적전제조건。문장지재통과이론모형급Besley동태박혁과정대거민、지방급중앙정부적경쟁행위진행모의，분석공공자원체도효솔화배치적장기균형，진일보설명경쟁궤제능구한제정부행사권력조성적비효솔。
There is a efficiency puzzle in the supply of public goods and social choice. In Tiebout model, competitive mechanism is brought into government behavior to perfect the revealed characteristics of group preference, which is the premise condition of realizing Pareto production. This paper simulates the model of the competitive behaviors of residents, local and central government by using theoretical model and Besley dynamic game processes, analyzes the long term equilibrium of public resources to reach the efficient configuration, and then further explain that competitive mechanism can control the inefficiency produced by government.
