CAJ | 학술논문

在基于相对业绩比较的锦标赛激励机制中，首位晋升制与末位淘汰制是两种常见的竞赛激励机制。在代理人能力分布不均情形下，将代理人之间的拆台行为引入传统的锦标赛模型，可以研究代理人能力分布不同时首位晋升制与末位淘汰制下代理人的行为以及对委托人收益的影响。通过数理模型推导可获得以下结论：第一，首位晋升制下代理人的努力水平和拆台水平均比较高，委托人采用首位晋升制更有利，能力分布对委托人最优选择不产生影响。第二，低能力代理人占多数时，高能力代理人努力水平过高，受到的拆台也更多，高能力代理人占多数时，低能力代理人努力水平更高受到的拆台更多，能力分布对代理人的行为产生影响。
재기우상대업적비교적금표새격려궤제중，수위진승제여말위도태제시량충상견적경새격려궤제。재대리인능력분포불균정형하，장대리인지간적탁태행위인입전통적금표새모형，가이연구대리인능력분포불동시수위진승제여말위도태제하대리인적행위이급대위탁인수익적영향。통과수리모형추도가획득이하결론：제일，수위진승제하대리인적노력수평화탁태수평균비교고，위탁인채용수위진승제경유리，능력분포대위탁인최우선택불산생영향。제이，저능력대리인점다수시，고능력대리인노력수평과고，수도적탁태야경다，고능력대리인점다수시，저능력대리인노력수평경고수도적탁태경다，능력분포대대리인적행위산생영향。
Winner-up tournaments and loser-out tournaments are two common forms of incentive mechanism in relative- performance-based tournaments. In this paper, we bring sabotage between heterogeneous agents into classic tournament model and study its influence on the principle＇s income in both winner-up tournaments and loser-out tournaments under different conditions. By deriving the mathematical model, we come to the following conclusions： First, the first promotion under the agent＇s effort level and sabotage level are relatively high, the client uses winner-up more favorable, ability distribution on the client does not affect the optimal choice. Second, low ability agents accounted for the majority, high ability of the agent＇s effort level is too high, the more trouble, high ability agents accounted for the majority, low ability of the agent＇s effort level is more higher self, affect the distribution of the agent＇s behavior ability.