CAJ | 학술논문

并购信息的违规披露是企业并购过程中存在的严重问题。目前,我国政府监管机构对违规披露并购信息的企业普遍惩罚较轻,导致在解决这一问题时有局限性。通过建立非对称信息条件下的企业并购信息监管基本博弈模型,分析政府管制成本、企业违规披露的惩罚及企业违规披露时获得的溢出收益三因素对政府监管的影响,得出提高对企业惩罚可以从根源上减少此种违法事件的结论,此结论通过广发证券借壳上市案得到验证。
병구신식적위규피로시기업병구과정중존재적엄중문제。목전,아국정부감관궤구대위규피로병구신식적기업보편징벌교경,도치재해결저일문제시유국한성。통과건립비대칭신식조건하적기업병구신식감관기본박혁모형,분석정부관제성본、기업위규피로적징벌급기업위규피로시획득적일출수익삼인소대정부감관적영향,득출제고대기업징벌가이종근원상감소차충위법사건적결론,차결론통과엄발증권차각상시안득도험증。
Illegal information disclosure is a serious problem in the process of company＇s M＆A. At present, there is a limitation to solve this problem as a result of that the government regulatory agencies always impose a slight and superficial punishment upon the violators. In this paper, a gambling model for the information monitory in company＇s M＆A is established under the condition of information asymmetry to analyze three factors that could affect the government agencies＇ behaviors. Such factors include the government regulation cost, the punishment and the spillover benefits of the violators＇. The model manifests that the intensification of punishment on the corporation＇s irregular and illegal disclosure can minimize such cases from the root, which has been verified by GF Securities backdoor listing case as well.