CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于终极控制人框架，以资本结构为对象研究中国上市公司终极控制人特征对公司融资决策的影响。研究结果表明，相对于国有终极控制人，非国有终极控制人选择较高比例的负债掏空上市公司的动机更加明显；终极控制人至上市公司之间控制链层级的增加将导致公司资本负债率的提高。
본문기우종겁공제인광가，이자본결구위대상연구중국상시공사종겁공제인특정대공사융자결책적영향。연구결과표명，상대우국유종겁공제인，비국유종겁공제인선택교고비례적부채도공상시공사적동궤경가명현；종겁공제인지상시공사지간공제련층급적증가장도치공사자본부채솔적제고。
Based on the structure of ultimate controlling shareholder, this paper studies the influence of ultimate con- troller on company financial decision-making, taking capital structure as object. The empirical results shows the non-state- owned ultimate controlling shareholder selects a higher corporate leverage and has more obvious motivation to tunnel the listed company. Meanwhile, the increase of controlling chain layers from the ultimate controlling shareholder to the listed corporation will lead to the increase of corporate capital structure.